Public confidence in higher education has dropped sharply in recent years. The main contributors appear to be a lack of ideological diversity in colleges and universities, constraints on open inquiry, and the erosion of empirical standards in parts of the academy. Here I describe two college-sponsored events dealing with “fat studies”—one in late 2024 and another in April 2026—which I attended out of simple curiosity about this academic discipline. Here is an account of the claims made at these events taken from my notes.

My biology and pre-med students were particularly intrigued by a Gender Studies talk that promised to “interrogate the false association between fat and unhealthiness” (see workshop description below). Being new to “fat studies,” I was curious to see more about this claim. Two years later, I decided to attend a second event, wondering whether the messaging had shifted in the age of Ozempic and following the 2024 elections. What I encountered may sound satirical, but it was not. The speakers were dead serious. I have kept the speakers’ names private; my aim is not to mock individuals but rather to show the persistence of anti-scientific perspectives in this field at my college. Both cases exemplify the ideological erosion of science that has led Americans to lose confidence in their colleges and universities.

In the first talk, sponsored by Women and Gender Studies, DEI initiatives, and American Studies, the audience was expected to participate, but the auditorium was nearly empty—most likely because the event fell on the day before Thanksgiving break. There were only three biology students (myself included), five gender-studies students, and a handful of professors and staff.

The event opened with identity: the speaker stated that she identified as “fat, white, and used they/them pronouns.” I learned that “obese,” “BMI,” and “weight” are seen as pejorative terms that should never be used. She added that it was bigoted to suggest that obesity is mainly a lower-socioeconomic-class issue tied to the inability to afford healthy food. This view, we were told, wrongly assumes that the foods fat people eat are unhealthy and that being fat is bad. We were then asked to “pair-share” with colleagues in the room, about our emotions and body image and recount when we first developed the idea that being fat is bad.

The speaker next wrote down the roots of “fatphobia” on the board (see figure below). Body mass index (BMI), she said, was invented to discriminate against fat people, and its origins lie in capitalism. White people were blamed for creating the notion that “whites are thin” as a way of oppressing black people. Medicine was described as another culprit: there is no such thing, we were told, as a “healthy diet.” Instead, “a healthy diet is what you like to eat.” Further, children were described as having an innate ability to sense how much food and what kind of food they need. The research on whether processed foods affect health was described as unclear. What ultimately harms fat people, the speaker claimed, is oppression and dieting. Anti-fatness, we learned, goes hand in hand with every other system of oppression: “Whenever we are talking about anti-fatness, we are also talking about white supremacy”.

The medical system was described as actively discriminatory: “When fat people come into the hospital with cancer, they are told to lose weight before being screened,” and waiting-room chairs are too small. These forms of discrimination, rather than physiology itself, were said to explain the observed correlations between fatness and health problems.

At this point people began asking questions. I inquired about animal studies: surely, fat rats do not die at higher rates because of fatphobia? The reply was nonsensical: “everyone knows fat is protective in rats.” A student noted the well-documented correlation between cardiovascular disease and fatness. The speaker asked for references. When he responded that there were thousands, she reminded the room that “correlation is not causation” and that people die from oppression and from being forced into diets.

A gender-studies student came to the speaker’s help, shouting at the student who asked the question: “Are you deaf? Are you not listening? Shut up and listen!” The speaker proceeded to write the word “Science” on the board under the heading “institutional problems.” She later stated that genetics, not food consumption, explains body weight: “People can be 15 pounds above or below their genetic makeup and no more or less.” This was another nonsensical idea, easily contradicted by looking at the recent past: just a couple generations ago people of every demographic group were skinnier than they are today, and the genetics of those groups could not have changed much in such a short time. The exchange illustrated how data-based questions were repositioned from a legitimate inquiry to an expression of overt bigotry.

I was struck by the speaker’s anti-scientific tone, the reflexive dismissal of evidence, and the flat-out distortion of established findings. I was left wondering how much of this perspective is taught in college classes, and how many students exposed to these distortions think that they can push back without being labeled bigots.

Share

My second encounter with “fat-studies,” in April 2026, was a talk sponsored by the Dively Fund (created to support LGBTQ events, although the talk contained almost no LGBTQ content). It was billed as “A conversation on Blackness, Queerness, Gender, Fatness, Disabilities and Their Intersections.” Attendance here was higher—roughly 20 students plus three adults, myself included.

As before, I approached the talk with genuine curiosity; I wondered whether this corner of “studies” would adapt or remain unchanged in the era of Ozempic and recent shifts in public discussions of obesity.

Some of the speaker’s themes overlapped with those of the first event, including the claim that “good and healthy” food is simply whatever you like to eat. There was also a brief and negative reference to Ozempic: “GLP-1s are terrible because they make fat people appear suicidal for not wanting to lose weight.”

The rest of the talk took a very different direction. Because the content was somewhat disjointed, I will share some direct quotes. We were told that “fatness was invented to prepare individuals for war by the Nazis” (though the speaker later added that it was invented by the slave trade). “Body fascism is now practiced in France, USA, Israel and Britain.” “The ideal body is militarized to displace and violate black people.” “Fat fascism is about the subjugation of the slave and slave-adjacent (Palestinians).” “The Jewish body is imposed on Palestinians by starvation and the denial of junk food [which is the kind of food they would like to eat].” “This subjugation did not begin with Trump; it began with democracy and those elected to represent society.” Michelle Obama’s healthy-lunch initiatives were cited as a pre-Trump example. “Fatphobia is the making of the slave.” “Fatness has been projected onto African flesh.” “You are not men or women; you are just fat or thin in a ship hold” (referring to slave ships). “After Nazis, COVID, HIV, [and] slaves, one must prove they are fit and not crippled—this is how ableism started.” “Nationalists don’t believe cripples have the right to exist.” “Freedom requires the death of our desires.” “Our love keeps us in shackles. We need to divest from love to bring the revolution” (though the speaker added that his love for his people was too strong to relinquish).

These two events were separated in time by the advent of GLP-1 receptor agonists, by shifts in U.S. obesity trends, and by decreasing public trust in academia. With all these changes, it is surprising that the core messages did not differ. This pattern shows that certain postmodern ideas are still firmly rooted in parts of higher education. In both sessions, accepted physiological results from epidemiology, animal models, and randomized controlled trials were largely recast as artifacts of oppression. Concepts central to medicine—BMI, or the existence of healthy versus less healthy dietary patterns—might not be flawless metrics, but they are certainly not ideological inventions motivated by fatphobia.

When college-sponsored events list ‘Science’ itself as an institutional problem, they expose a deep split in how people view knowledge and truth—and in what these events are really selling. The talks confirmed this split: questions were met not with counter-evidence but with accusations of bigotry, rote reminders that ‘correlation is not causation,’ or outright commands to stop speaking—along with preposterous assertions that flouted basic standards of evidence. Such tactics do more than mislead audiences; by violating the very norms of reason and evidence that people have long accepted as good science, they accelerate the erosion of public trust in both science and higher education.

Editor’s note: As documented in these pages, this postmodern nonsense has spread into STEMM. For example, the Inclusivity Style Guide of the American Chemical Society asks authors to avoid such phrases as “people affected by obesity,” “obesity is a public health crisis,” and “healthy-weight participants were more likely to experience this effect than the participants at an unhealthy weight.” A pamphlet published by the University of Illinois Chicago School of Public Health claims that public health anti-obesity campaigns are an example of “fatphobia,” that public health’s “focus on body size is rooted in racism,” that “higher weight is not causal to worse health outcomes,” and that “focusing on weight ignores systematic injustices.” And then people are surprised by the loss of public trust in science and academia…

When MIT’s Election Data and Science Lab assumed management of the index in 2017, something curious happened. The framework remained, but the mission quietly shifted. What began as a broad assessment of election quality morphed into a narrower gauge of administrative efficiency. By 2026, the index had become a tool for certifying that American elections are “well-run” and “continue to get better every year”—even as the metrics themselves measure almost nothing related to election integrity.

The reformulated index currently employs 19 indicators organized into four categories: electoral environment, election infrastructure, mail voting, and in-person voting. States are rewarded for high voter turnout, low mail ballot rejection rates, minimal wait times, online registration systems, and membership in ERIC (the Electronic Registration Information Center). These are defensible measures of administrative smoothness. They are not, however, measures of election security.

The index contains no indicators for voter ID requirements, citizenship verification, voter roll accuracy, or detection of duplicate voting across jurisdictions. It does not attempt to measure ballot harvesting, chain-of-custody procedures, or the quality of post-election audits beyond whether they exist. In the EPI’s own methodology documentation, the Lab acknowledges that indicators were selected based on “data availability and consistency across states”—meaning that phenomena difficult to measure, such as fraud, are structurally excluded from consideration.

This creates an index that can declare election administration “strong” while remaining blind to the integrity concerns that have animated much of the national debate. A state could theoretically have rampant non-citizen voting and still score perfectly on every EPI metric, provided ballots were processed quickly and rejection rates stayed low. The index measures how efficiently votes were counted, not whether the votes counted were cast by eligible voters.

The consequences of this methodological lacuna are visible in the index’s 2024 rankings. Minnesota—a state whose biggest city has become synonymous with large-scale public fraud—ranks first in the nation with an 89% score. This is the same Minnesota where federal prosecutors secured convictions in the Feeding Our Future scandal, described by Attorney General Merrick Garland as “the country’s largest pandemic relief fraud scheme.” In that case, a nonprofit exploiting federal child nutrition programs stole over $240 million by submitting false meal counts and fraudulent attendance rosters—precisely the kind of systematic document fraud that would be trivially easy to apply to mail-in ballots.

Minnesota’s Somali community, which figured prominently in Feeding Our Future, has also been implicated in a wider pattern of Medicaid and daycare fraud that federal prosecutors now estimate at $9 billion across multiple programs. In December 2025, FBI Director Kash Patel called the daycare fraud investigations “the tip of a very large iceberg,” while federal agents raided more than 20 Minneapolis facilities. Minneapolis City Council member Jamal Osman’s wife operated a Feeding Our Future meal site that received over $400,000 in funding; Osman himself was the subject of Project Veritas allegations in 2020 regarding ballot harvesting in Rep. Ilhan Omar’s district, though Minnesota law permitted the practice at the time.

None of this appears on MIT’s Election Performance Index, because systematic fraud and lax enforcement are invisible to metrics that measure only whether ballots move through the system efficiently.

The political valence of MIT’s methodology becomes clearer when examined alongside the Lab’s public advocacy. In April 2026, Lab Director Charles Stewart III told USA Today that complying with President Trump’s executive order on mail-in ballot verification would be “a logistical nightmare” representing “magical thinking.” Stewart has been equally vocal in his opposition to the SAVE Act, which would require proof of citizenship for voter registration—a requirement already in place in 176 countries, including Mexico, India, and every nation in South America. When asked about such proposals, Stewart frames them as burdensome obstacles to voter access rather than reasonable safeguards against fraud.

This rhetorical posture is consistent with the EPI’s design. The index rewards states that make voting maximally frictionless and penalizes those that impose verification burdens, even when those burdens serve legitimate security purposes. States with aggressive signature-matching or identity verification see higher mail ballot rejection rates, which lowers their EPI score—despite the fact that catching fraudulent ballots is precisely what those procedures are designed to do.

The Heritage Foundation’s Election Integrity Scorecard offers a useful contrast. Heritage rates states on voter ID laws, citizenship verification, ballot harvesting restrictions, and chain-of-custody requirements. Its rankings produce nearly opposite results to MIT’s: Nevada and Colorado, which score in the top tier of the EPI, rank poorly on Heritage’s integrity-focused criteria because they have weak voter ID laws and expansive universal mail voting. The two indexes are measuring different things entirely—and calling them by different names reveals the game. MIT measures “election performance.” Heritage measures election integrity.

The distinction matters because language shapes perception. By branding its work as “election science” and publishing under the MIT imprimatur, the Election Lab lends the credibility of a world-class STEM institution to what is fundamentally a political choice about which values to prioritize. Voter convenience and administrative efficiency are legitimate values. So are ballot security and voter verification. An index that measures only the former while claiming to assess “election administration” as a whole is not science. It is partisan advocacy wearing a lab coat.

The problem is not that MIT’s researchers have political opinions. The problem is that they have constructed a measurement system that structurally excludes the concerns of half the country, then pronounced American elections “strong” based on metrics that do not address those concerns. This is not objectivity. It is the politics of selective measurement.

When Pew handed the index to MIT in 2017, the project’s stated purpose was to “drive a conversation about best practices in how to keep elections safe, secure, and accurate.” Nine years later, “safe” and “secure” have been quietly redefined to mean “convenient and efficient.” The index that once promised to measure election quality now certifies election administration as excellent while carefully avoiding any metric that might suggest otherwise.

Minnesota’s #1 ranking is not an anomaly. It is the index working exactly as designed.

Ideological capture in some departments or disciplines creates a self-perpetuating problem. It drives conservatives into hiding, discourages young conservatives from entering the field, and fosters a perception of leftwing groupthink that undermines trust in higher education, especially among conservatives. The end result is weaker universities with less ideological diversity.

It’s time for conservative faculty to stop “keeping their heads down until tenure.” Universities need bold, excellent conservative scholars—not undercover ones—to strengthen their institutions. Having worked at a free-market think tank before academia, my sympathies were clear. Yet as the only openly right-wing faculty member in my college, I earned tenure, served as program director, and became department chair. Here is my advice.

Follow the Roadhouse rules—Be Nice

In Road House (the original, not the terrible remake), the inimitable Patrick Swayze tells his bouncers, “I want you to be nice, until it’s time to not be nice.” Great advice for everyone, but especially conservative faculty. As a free-market conservative in a college of education, few colleagues agreed with me on anything—from school finance to school choice. Yet disagreeing doesn’t mean being disagreeable. One of the best compliments I ever received came from a veteran colleague: “I disagree with just about everything you say, but I really enjoy working with you.” That’s the reputation you want.

Pick Your Battles

The time may come when it is “time to not be nice,” but until then keep your powder dry. You don’t need to contest every issue. Once, a far-left colleague stalled program changes in a curriculum committee meeting for an hour. In the end, the changes passed unanimously, and her obstruction only frustrated everyone. Don’t be that colleague. If you make a mountain out of every molehill, people won’t listen when it really matters. Later, when I worked with a legislator to seek a ban of DEI hiring mandates, the university administration ultimately heeded my concerns. They took the time to meet with me and listened as I explained the problem. Had I been known as a constant troublemaker, I doubt they would have given my arguments as much credence.

Do Good Work

The great thing about academia is that expectations for success are typically clear: publication is the coin of the realm. Publishing often, and in top journals, can make you almost undeniable for tenure and promotion. Many departments spell out exactly how many publications are needed. Hit or exceed those targets. For conservatives, this can be harder in some disciplines. If your research challenges accepted paradigms, placing papers may be difficult. Sometimes that cannot be helped, but often there are paths: go elsewhere, call out bias, or reframe the issue.

If a journal is particularly hostile, submit elsewhere without delay. If a reviewer is particularly biased, call it out. Once, a reviewer criticized my citations of conservative scholars without questioning my methods. I noted the bias in my R&R, refused the suggested revisions, and the paper was accepted. Another time, a reviewer criticized my conclusions and suggested revisions that would have completely changed the whole point of my piece. I refused and suggested to the editor he publish my piece and offer the reviewer an opportunity to write a response piece. Again, my paper was published and, better yet, upon publication it already had one citation!

Finally, reframe the issue. In my research on teacher pensions, arguments about unfunded liabilities fell flat with colleagues. So, I used language they understood. I demonstrated that defined-benefit pension plans that use a short time span at the end of a teacher’s career to determine pension benefits are inequitable as are state subsidies for pension payments. Framing can make all the difference.

Use Service Strategically

Junior faculty are often shielded from onerous service responsibilities and for good reason. Committees can be an incredible time suck and universities have no shortage of them. One of my favorites was the faculty senate’s “committee on committees,” which decided who served on other committees. While it is wise to be judicious about service, don’t skip service entirely. Look for opportunities that double as networking. Join committees that connect you with colleagues at your institution and in your field. From graduate school through my early assistant professorship, I volunteered at a leading education policy conference. Just a week a year, it let me meet senior scholars and peers at other institutions. Done well, service can advance both your influence and your career.

Network and Have Options

Following my advice may require risk and boldness. The greatest boost to courage is a network of colleagues you can rely on. Start networking in graduate school. If you are out of graduate school, begin networking now. Get to know people in your field and make your name known. At conferences, for example, I organized panels, reaching out to well-regarded scholars to participate. They appreciated that I took on the onus of the conference submission and I was able to be on panels with terrific scholars. A strong network opens professional opportunities and strengthens your tenure case. External letters can make or break a case. I’ve seen firsthand external letters be the deciding factor on a tenure vote.

But don’t just network among academics. Get to know the players in your state. Most states have free-market think tanks or other organizations seeking to influence policy. Get connected to those organizations that align with your views. While these connections will rarely help you in academia, they can lead to contracts, grants, appointments on commissions, and the like. Twice I was appointed by the President Pro Tem of the state Senate to serve on committees, which counted as service.

Moreover, a network both in and out of higher education provides alternatives. Fear of losing a job with no alternatives keeps many conservatives hidden. With the connections I cultivated, I knew I had options.

The academic life is amazing, and it is a privilege to hold such an office, but you should not hide who you are or what you believe to remain in that position. The great C.S. Lewis wrote, “If I find in myself a desire which no experience in this world can satisfy, the most probable explanation is that I was made for another world.” Lewis, of course, was a Christian suggesting that we are not meant for this world, but a similar thing applies here. If you find that you are at an institution that is completely hostile to who you are and to your scholarship, it may be the case that you were meant for another place.

James V. Shuls, Ph.D., is the Head of the Education Liberty branch of the Institute for Governance and Civics at Florida State University

American universities—especially in the humanities and social sciences—have undergone a decades-long shift away from the Western intellectual tradition and toward ideological and activist content (see Bloom 1987; Dewey 1916). We present a keyword-based methodology for quantifying this process using course catalog data. Applying it to thirteen years of University of Chicago catalogs (2012–2025), we find that the progressive-signal share of the catalog more than doubled from 12.7% to 28.3%, while the Western-canon signal remained flat at ≈12%, causing the progressive-to-canon ratio to rise from 1.0× to 2.4×. These patterns are most pronounced in the humanities and social sciences, yet, perhaps unexpectedly, they also extend into STEM fields. We propose a collaborative, open index of curriculum content at the university-year level to help families, donors, and policymakers make informed decisions.*

* Policymakers should refrain from the temptation to micro-manage the university curriculum. Such attempts will likely be counterproductive to the goal of promoting and revitalizing the Western tradition.

2. Methodology

We classify every course in a university catalog using two keyword lists: a progressive list and a Western canon list, as described below. We assign a course to a category if its title or description contains at least one keyword from the category’s keyword list.

We matched via word-boundary regular expressions on the combined title and description text (case-insensitive). Word-boundary matching ensures that partial matches are avoided (e.g., the term “race” does not match “interface” or “brace”). Each course’s title and description are concatenated into a single text field; if any keyword from a given list appears within that text, the course is flagged for that category.

The progressive keyword list comprises approximately 55 terms and phrases signaling engagement with progressive social frameworks, diversity/equity/inclusion initiatives, or critical identity scholarship. These terms are organized into eleven thematic sub-categories, shown in Table 1.

The Western canon keyword list comprises approximately 45 terms and phrases signaling engagement with the traditional Western intellectual and literary canon, spanning classical antiquity through the Enlightenment. These terms are organized into six thematic sub-categories, shown in Table 2.

2.1 Classification rules and interpretation

A course may match both lists, one, or neither. The categories are non-exclusive: for example, a seminar on Aristotle’s political philosophy that also discusses social justice concepts would be flagged under both the canon and progressive signals.

We acknowledge the limitations of this type of analysis. The signals are coarse and are likely to yield many false positives and false negatives. The signals are also easily manipulable. A university can manipulate signals by avoiding these terms without changing the substance of what is taught to students. The value of these signals, however, lies in tracking changes over time and differences across institutions.

3. An Example: The University of Chicago

The University of Chicago occupies a unique position in American higher education. Its undergraduate Core Curriculum, built on the Hutchins-era Great Books model, has historically been the strongest institutional commitment to the Western canon at any major research university. If curriculum degradation is occurring even at Chicago, it is likely occurring everywhere.

We extract course data from thirteen annual catalogs (2012–2013 through 2024–2025). After deduplicating crosslisted courses, which appear under multiple department codes, we obtain 21,381 unique courses across 114 departments. Departments are mapped to broad areas: Humanities, Social Sciences, STEM, Professional, and Other.

Figure 1 presents the central finding. The progressive signal rose from 12.7% of the catalog in 2012–2013 to 28.3% in 2024–2025—more than doubling over thirteen years. The canon signal dropped from 13.2% to 11.9%. The progressive-to-canon ratio consequently rose from 1.0× (parity) to 2.4×.

Table 3 shows that the progressive signal is highest in the Social Sciences (27.4%) and Humanities (24.6%). The progressive signal is naturally lower in STEM (7.6%) but still unexpectedly high given the technical nature of STEM content.

4. Toward a Curriculum Content Index

Quantifying curriculum content across institutions and over time could serve the same function as the FIRE Free Expression Rankings: providing transparent, comparable data that families, donors, legislators, and University administrators can use to make informed decisions.

We envision a Curriculum Content Index (CCI) at the university-year level, constructed from publicly available course catalog data and syllabi. Ideally, one should also include student enrollment data to get a more accurate understanding of the content students are actually learning from universities. Perhaps understandably, universities are reluctant to share this information. But transparency is the best disinfectant here.

Such an index would allow prospective students to assess how much of a university’s catalog engages the Western intellectual tradition versus ideological content; donors to direct funding toward institutions that maintain intellectual breadth, and policymakers to monitor trends and evaluate the effects of reform efforts.

Building such an index requires data from many institutions. We invite scholars, students, administrators, and concerned citizens to collaborate on this project by contributing course catalog data—whether in CSV, PDF, or other machine-readable formats—and by helping to refine the keyword methodology. The analysis code and data for the University of Chicago is publicly available at this link, and the methodology is designed to be simple enough that any institution’s catalog can be processed in a few hours.

A word of caution is in order. Keyword-based textual analysis of course descriptions is a blunt instrument. A course flagged by our progressive keyword list may turn out, on closer inspection, to be a rigorous scholarly treatment of the topic; conversely, a course that escapes detection may nonetheless promote an activist agenda in practice. The signals we measure should therefore be understood as a noisy first approximation—useful for identifying broad trends and prompting further inquiry, but never a substitute for substantive evaluation of what is actually taught. Policymakers, in particular, should resist the temptation to use simple keyword counts as the basis for funding decisions or regulatory action. Our goal is to promote transparency and informed conversation, not to supply a scorecard that short-circuits careful judgment.

References

Bloom, Allan. 1987. The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today’s Students. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Dewey, John. 1916. Democracy and Education. New York: Macmillan.

This text analyzes the influence of values and ideology on science and medicine, emphasizing that these fields are never isolated from the social and political contexts in which they operate. Three types of values are distinguished: epistemic (objectivity, truth, rigor), normative (Merton’s norms: universalism, communalism, disinterestedness, organized skepticism), and societal (priorities, ethics, collective responsibilities). The text highlights two opposing philosophical positions: the stance of axiological neutrality, which advocates for science independent of societal values to protect its integrity, and the societal stance, which sees science as always permeated by collective values. The author then examines the politicization of science, which can stem from both the left (denial of scientific facts, social justice ideology, cancel culture, critical theories) and the right (denial of scientific facts and consensus, ideological and political instrumentalization). Politicization threatens objectivity, credibility, and the capacity for innovation. This leads to public loss of trust, diminished credibility of experts, a brake on scientific progress, and polarization of public debate. The text warns against the spiral of sectarianism and counter-sectarianism, which undermines democratic debate and intellectual rigor. It is, thus, necessary to defend independence, transparency, and responsibility in science and medicine to preserve trust, innovation, and integrity, calling for vigilance against all ideological excesses.

I. Introduction

Science and medicine are not isolated activities; they are deeply influenced by the values and ideology of the societies in which they evolve. Research choices, data interpretation, and health policies are all guided by normative principles, collective beliefs, and political interests. However, ideologies can negatively impact the way science and medicine are conducted and the results obtained. This is illustrated by aberrations such as Lysenkoism and the Nazification of science and medicine, as well as more recent events like “wokeism” or the totalitarian tendencies of the Trump administration.

We will first discuss the meaning of values and their impact in science and medicine, as well as associated philosophical positions. Then, we will examine the politicization of science and its consequences for science and medicine. In this text, science and medicine are treated jointly, with medicine considered in the context of biomedical scientific research.

II. Values in Science and Medicine

Values relate to different aspects: epistemic values, normative values concerning the community of actors in science and medicine (represented by Merton’s norms), and societal values.

II.1. Epistemic Values

Epistemic values are the criteria aimed at knowledge: objectivity, truth, justification, understanding. They include accuracy, precision, predictive power, explanatory power, coherence, simplicity, scope, unification, testability, robustness, reproducibility, reliability of measurements, transparency, fruitfulness, and clarity. These values form the normative structure of science and guarantee the quality and rigor of the knowledge produced.

Epistemic values are the fundamental principles that guide scientific research towards the production of reliable, objective, and useful knowledge. They serve as criteria for judging the quality of a theory, method, or scientific result. Their purpose is to ensure that science does not merely accumulate facts, but seeks understanding, justification, and truth.

II.2. Normative Values According to Merton

According to Merton (Merton, 1942), science rests on four intrinsic normative principles: Universalism (discoveries must have general validity and be evaluated without prejudice), Communalism (knowledge is accessible to all and should be openly shared), Disinterestedness (objectivity takes precedence over personal interests), and Organized Skepticism (verification or refutation must be rigorous; critical examination is essential).

These norms are distinct from epistemic values because they concern the activity of scientists taken as a whole in both fundamental and applied research, such as biomedical research. Thus, they relate to the collective management and behavior of research actors. They also differ from societal values, as the latter involve decisions, support, or constraints exercised by society, which orients, supports, imposes, or limits scientific and medical activity.

II.3. Societal Values

Societal values guide scientific priorities, ethics, responsibility, frame the actors, and determine the consequences of scientific activity on humans, society, the animal kingdom, nature and the planet. These are :

• Orientation of Scientific Priorities: Values influence the choice of research topics and set priorities in scientific development.

• Ethics and Responsibility: Values guide scientific ethics, setting acceptable limits and researcher responsibility during experiments.

• Framework of Scientific Activity: Extent and limitation of the scientific field, risks, or categories to include (ethnicity, sex, etc.).

• Framing of Actors (Scientists): Who is eligible to do science and on what criteria is this choice made?

• Consequences of Scientific Activity: On populations, the animal kingdom, the planet, etc., and responsibility.

The implementation of societal values in scientific and biomedical activity carries risks due to their subjective nature: Who defines these values? What is their scope of application? Are certain scientific and biomedical activities permitted or prohibited? How is the implementation of these values ensured? What about academic freedom? While I might agree with the values proposed in a humanist society, what about authoritarian societies or situations driven by authoritarian activism? There is a danger that these values may be manipulated by ideologues to destabilize the ethical framework of open societies that I support. This is closely linked to the politicization of science.

The distinction between epistemic and societal values has been criticized (Longino, 1990, 1996). It is true that there is some overlap between these two concepts. However, epistemic values are distinguished by their scope as they directly address how research is conducted at the individual level by each researcher, relating directly to the investigative process. Societal values, by contrast, are more collective and tie the researcher to societal demands, which can have positive but also negative effects.

III. Philosophical Positions on Values in Science

Two main philosophical stances oppose each other:

III.1. Axiological Neutrality Position

Within the perspective of axiological neutrality, science must disregard societal values. This stance is advocated by Bertrand Russell, Karl Popper, Max Weber, Bridgman, and Michael Polanyi. It emerged due to abuses and distortions driven by the authoritarian ideologies of Nazism and Communism. American physicist Percy Williams Bridgman said: “The challenge of understanding nature taxes our capacities to the utmost. In meeting this challenge, man can accept no handicap. That is why scientific freedom is essential, and why any artificial limitation of tools or subjects of study is unthinkable” (Bridgman 1948, 72) and “The scientist has discovered that it is not enough to rely on his neighbor’s word, but that, to be certain, he must be able to verify a result himself. Thus, the scientist is the enemy of all authoritarianism” (Bridgman 1955, 82). In the context of axiological neutrality, societal values are seen as a threat that can negatively affect epistemic values. Epistemic values are especially endangered by moralization and authoritarian imposition. For “axiologic neutralists,” science in all its forms obeys precise internal rules, rules that are epistemic and normative in Merton’s sense (Merton, 1942). Bridgman was critical of socialized science and advocated for normative independence in science. Bridgman was not formally opposed to the integration of certain values, but this must be an individual commitment and not imposed in an authoritarian manner.

Two versions of the axiological neutrality thesis can be considered: a strong version focused on the individual, where only epistemic values and individual normative commitment matter as guarantees of intellectual freedom; and a weak version, where the posture of axiological neutrality allows the inclusion of certain societal values, provided they do not disrupt epistemic values, scientific project orientation, and rigorous conduct.

III.2. Societal Position

Proponents of the societal thesis argue that societal values are always present and continually influence science. This position is defended by Karl Mannheim, Helen Longino, Heather Douglas, and Kevin Elliott (Elliott, 2023).

Helen Longino (Longino, 1990), for example, defends the idea that knowledge production is a social enterprise, where the relevance of data depends on human beliefs and hypotheses. However, this depends on how these beliefs are defined. If they are defined individually, it is admissible since every scientist has a priori knowledge, constituted by the work of predecessors, and this knowledge is also nourished by exchanges with colleagues. However, attention must be paid to dominant beliefs when they are imposed in an authoritarian manner or infused insidiously into society by ideology. Dominant beliefs can also be tested and refuted by rational and empirical approaches, as historical examples (Harvey, Semmelweis) show (Bikfalvi, 2023).

Science philosopher Heather Douglas advocates for scientific responsibility (Douglas 2009, 2021). She states, “The current ideal of value neutrality rests on the idea that scientists should act as if they were morally autonomous from society, particularly that they should not take into account the broader consequences of their work” (Douglas 2009). Heather Douglas notably criticizes Bridgman in this respect. For Bridgman, societal considerations are seen as a handicap to conducting research, which Douglas views as irresponsible.

IV. Ideology and Politicization of Science and Medicine

Politicization can be considered as an infusion of societal values into science. This can have a positive effect when these values support certain research directions but leave scientists free to conduct their projects. Politicization of science can have a negative effect and lead to biased research when results are oriented by partisan interests. This leads to public loss of trust, diminished credibility of experts, a brake on scientific progress, and polarization of public debate.

This politicization is especially dangerous when it denies facts and objectivity and is under the control of ideologies. Another component is relativism, which is at the origin of post-truth and affects all political currents, both right and left. It manifests as ideological capture of facts, construction of pseudo-realities, and distancing from reality.

Politicization of science and medicine is thus not the privilege of the “left” or the “right,” and I provide examples below to illustrate my point:

IV.1. Politicization from the “Left”: Social Justice in Science and Medicine1

Certain ideologies from the “left” restrict academic freedom of expression, harm objectivity, and hinder scientific progress. This has materialized as “cancel culture,” which eliminates those who do not conform to the prevailing dogma.

The recent emergence of social justice ideology (SJI) is an illustration. SJI manifests itself through three major intellectual currents: Critical Race Theory (CRT), the decolonization movement, and gender/queer theory. These currents are derived to varying degrees from cultural Marxism (Gramsci, Lukacs). CRT is an Americanized and racialized form of critical theory inherited from the Frankfurt School (see Corradetti, 2013, for a detailed review), to which is added intersectionality, a concept developed by K. Crenshaw (Crenshaw, 1991). Intersectionality refers to how systems of inequality based on gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, and other forms of discrimination “intersect.” The current decolonization movement has been and continues to be promoted by researchers mainly from Africa, South America, or India, while the gender/queer branch comes from radical neo-feminism, which later evolved into radical intersectional neo-feminism by incorporating Crenshaw’s intersectionality concept. Academics, especially in law schools, have played a key role in intellectually structuring these movements, now widely diffused throughout many branches of the humanities and social sciences.

SJI has been strongly amplified by major social media groups (Facebook, Twitter, X, etc.) and has penetrated all sectors of society, from art (e.g., antiracist Shakespeare), education, private or public companies, cultural and scholarly societies, to scientific publishing, etc.

It was thought that STEMM fields (science, technology, engineering, mathematics, and medicine) were immune to SJI because of their rigorous scientific method. However, it has turned out that this is not the case, as SJI now has a firm foothold in many scientific and medical institutions (Royal Society of Chemistry, National Academy of Science, American Medical Association, American Psychological Association, American Mathematical Society, etc.), as well as in STEMM university departments.

Attacks against science, particularly biomedical research and clinical practice, unfold along three axes: epistemic foundations, politics and society, and praxis. The consequences of this dynamic are significant, including: (1) replacing epistemic foundations with SJI corpora; (2) denouncing supposed racism and sexism everywhere in STEMM; (3) social conformity and erasure of diversity of opinion in STEMM; (4) reducing all health disparities to these variables (racism, sexism); (5) introducing SJI and especially CRT into medical school curricula; (6) adapting treatments according to CRT and gender criteria; (7) canceling dissenters.

Here are examples from biology and medicine (Coyne, Maroja 2024): (1) Attacking the binary nature of sex and claiming that sex is a spectrum; (2) Labeling the study of genetic differences among people as racist; (3) Dissociating biology from gender and normalizing disorders of sexual development; (4) Calling evolutionary psychology pseudoscience; (5) Promoting equivalence between indigenous knowledge and modern science.

A few years ago, these statements would have been considered irrational or even deranged.

Social Justice Ideology in Scientific Publishing

Scientific publishing has also been captured by SJI. Numerous editorials and a deluge of mediocre articles have been published in major journals such as Science, Nature, Cell, The Lancet, the New England Journal of Medicine, etc. Notable developments include DEI (Diversity, Equity, Inclusion) statements and Citation Justice Statements (CJS) (Dworkin et al., 2020). Thus, in some STEMM sectors, it was/is requested to add a DEI statement at the end of publications. Authors had to affirm, for example, that their study respects a gender balance for non-human subjects, that some authors belong to minorities or are disabled, that they received support to strengthen minority representation in science, that the author list includes contributors from where the research was conducted, etc. (Ray, 2022).

Regarding citation diversity statements, authors may specify (Ray, 2022):

“We are committed to promoting intellectual and social diversity in science and academic research, and we have taken this into account when writing this article. We actively sought to promote diversity in our reference list while ensuring all sources cited were relevant and appropriate. We included some references to increase diversity but did not omit any for this purpose. To assess the diversity of our references, we obtained the predicted gender of the first and last author of each reference using a database recording the likelihood that a first name is borne by a woman (gender-api.com). Removing self-citations, our reference list includes 30% woman/woman, 11% man/woman, 15% woman/man, and 44% man/man. This method has limitations: a) names, pronouns, and social media profiles used to build the database do not always reflect gender identity, and b) it does not account for intersex, non-binary, or transgender people. We look forward to future work that could help us better support equitable practices in science.”

Specific software has been developed to check gender/ethnicity balance in citations (Dworkin et al., 2020). The causal explanations for these differences are always bias, stereotypes, exclusion of minorities, hegemony (white, cisgender, heterosexual men), and systemic sexism or racism (Zurn et al., 2022). Statements like: “the history of science as an objective quest for truth led by solitary white geniuses has pernicious effects…” or “many efforts already aim to contextualize scientific progress outside the dominant narrative of white, male European triumph…” are found. These statements show no recognition for men who have greatly contributed to science, technology, and medicine, and thus to human progress (such as Semmelweis, Pasteur, Koch, or Einstein).

A good example of SJI in scientific publishing is Nature’s special issue on racism, which aims to overcome the “toxic legacy” of science (Nature Editors, 2022). This issue, better titled “Special Issue on Antiracism,” was coordinated by Melissa Nobles, a political scientist, chancellor of MIT in Cambridge (USA). Nature, in its introduction, displays all the elements of social justice language, in line with many articles already published by the journal. According to their own words: “Nature has helped create this racist legacy. After George Floyd’s death during a police intervention in Minneapolis, Minnesota, in 2020, Nature committed to becoming an agent of change and ending discriminatory practices and systemic racism.” This is not only an admission of past but also present faults (without specifying any “racist” articles published today). It amounts to a form of excessive self-flagellation.

The introductory statement of those responsible for this issue shows their total commitment to antiracism and social justice ideology. Published articles range from subjective accounts of experienced racism to analyses of systemic racism, racism in computing or medicine, or racism in British research institutions, such as Imperial College, where Huxley (Darwin’s “bulldog”) is presented as racist. This is a blatant example of presentism—a phenomenon also affecting Paul Broca, a famous French physician and scientist, major contributor to neurology and founder of anthropology. In his lifetime, he was considered progressive, but is now viewed as racist and sexist. Moreover, physiological differences become a pretext for accusations of racism, such as measuring oxygen levels in the skin, which naturally differ in people with dark versus light skin. The omission of this fact in the past is interpreted as racism. Overall, the articles in this issue illustrate what Carl Hempel called “the error of affirming the consequent”: a hypothesis is considered true whenever results support it, leading to confirmation bias.

Social Justice Ideology in Medical Practice

A final example is the intrusion of Critical Race Theory (CRT) into clinical management. Michelle Morse, chief medical officer of the New York City Health Department, declared in a tweet: “Racism is the risk factor, not race. We must take race into account to promote equity. Not being white and Latino origin are social risk factors for developing severe covid, due to historical structural racism.” She thus promotes what she considers a truly antiracist approach to health management. In an article published in The Lancet, Michelle Morse is cited as saying: “We will never achieve health equity unless we adopt a race-conscious approach” (Samarasekera, 2022). The American Medical Association (AMA) seems to support this approach (see the webinars of the Center of Health Equity, e.g., American Medical Association on Health Equity 2021). Importing CRT into clinical medicine is a blatant betrayal of the very goal of medical practice. This is not saying that enthicity should not be taken into acount in the diagnosis of disease (i.e Sickle cell anemia). It just says that the CRT framework of social justice should not be applied when treating patients (i.e. prioritizing ethicity over severity of clinical symptoms). No one should seek care at a hospital implementing this type of approach.

Another facet of SJI is the medicalization of gender change within gender ideology. Driven by activism, medicine has abdicated its responsibility to the patient’s well-being; it has become the executive arm of ideology by introducing “Gender Affirming Care” (GAF). With the Cass report, the scandals surrounding the Tavistock clinic in England and leaked WPATH emails, GAF seems to be in decline.

The examples above are from the period before 2024. The influence of SJI is still present but now clearly declining.

IV.2. Politicization of science by authoritarian and neo-reactionary movements

Science and medicine can be influenced by ideologies or political interests, as illustrated by Soviet biology under Lysenko in the USSR or the Nazi regime’s desire to impose “German science,” promoted by Stark, Lennart, Lehmann, Bieberbach in Nazi Germany (Stark 1934). Furthermore, classical anti-science positions are represented by religious fundamentalism rejecting evolutionary theory (creationists…), because contradicting with holy scriptures.

A new phenomenon is represented by a neo-reactionary and anti-democratic mouvement which reflects recent developments in western countries including the United States. The contestation of scientific facts manifests itself in several areas, notably climate science and vaccination calling into question scientific integrity in public policy. Expertise is attacked because claimed to be guided by commercial political interests (i.e. in Germany the « Querdenker » linked to the AFD political parti). This has direct consequences for the management of health crises, such as during the COVID-19 pandemic. These attacks on science are promoted by militant “right-wing” movements. This situation raises concerns about the ability of science to remain independent and objective in the face of ideological and political pressure.

Below, a few examples:

• Vaccination: COVID-19 vaccination was described as harmful to health and accused of causing more deaths than COVID-19 itself. Incorrect analyses were made due to misunderstanding statistics and causation. This disinformation fueled distrust of vaccination campaigns and weakened the national health response. The consequences of this attitude are general vaccine skepticism and an increase in preventable infections, as shown by the recent rise in measles cases in the USA.

• Paracetamol and Autism: Public debates were fueled by ideological positions, to the detriment of scientific facts. Robust studies had shown that paracetamol does not impact baby health when taken during pregnancy. However, RFK Jr. from the Trump administration referred to a poorly conducted meta-analysis that seemed to indicate the contrary, contradicting the plethora of robust previous studies and a recent meta-analysis (D’Antonio et al, 2026).

• Reduction in Funding for Academic Institutions: Paradoxically, the humanities were less affected than some other disciplines, such as “hard” sciences and biomedical research, which saw reduced funding, hindering research and innovation. This resource reduction jeopardizes researchers’ ability to pursue important work for knowledge advancement and societal benefit. At most, specific areas of the humanities (that promote CSJ ideology) should have been targeted but not funding for hard science and medicine which are important for science and society to thrive.

• Undermining Expertise: many experts were replaced by ideologues, compromising the quality of decisions made in health and research. This replacement resulted in a loss of trust in institutions and the spread of unvalidated scientific information, even if true that some experts were ideologically compromised (and should have been replaced).

• Attack on Public Health Measures: Dangerous substances (perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances, PFAS) or global health programs (USAID) were targeted, illustrating science and medicine’s vulnerability to partisan interests. These attacks may have delayed or prevented effective population protection measures.

• Limitations on Foreign Researchers to work in the USA : Limitation of H1B visas for highly qualified foreigners. According to the Trump administration: “The H-1B non-immigrant visa program was created to allow temporary workers to enter the United States to perform additional highly skilled functions, but it has been knowingly exploited to replace, rather than supplement, American workers with a lower-paid, less skilled workforce. The large-scale replacement of American workers by systematic abuse of the program has compromised both our economic and national security.” If this policy had been applied in the twentieth century, major scientific figures like John von Neumann or Enrico Fermi would not have contributed to American scientific development.

• Attack on Climate Science: Challenging scientific consensus on climate is a striking example of politicizing facts. Trump administration decisions often ignored scientific data to favor economic or ideological interests, even withdrawing the United States from the Paris Agreement and weakening environmental regulations.

Another worrisome development comes from neo-reactionary movements that champion a “Dark Enlightenment” (Miranda, 2026). These groups, originating from internet blogs and forums, actively criticize democracy by claiming that society is inherently unequal, and that democracies attempt to artificially erase these natural disparities among humans. They argue that there is an innate biodiversity in intelligence and ability which should be acknowledged and strengthened, rather than suppressed. According to this ideology, academic institutions, universities, and mainstream media are accused of manipulating public opinion by promoting policies that counteract this supposed natural order. Curtis Yarvin, a software engineer, coined the term “the Cathedral” in his blogs to refer to universities and official media, portraying them as institutions that must be dismantled for Western society to thrive (Yarvin, 2021).

As we have seen in the previous chapter, academic institutions and universities have been the powerhouse of the critical social justice (“Woke”) movement, and it is true that they disseminated a toxic power dynamic that had infiltrated science and medicine. But the worldview promoted by neo-reactionaries similarly counter democracy and open society.

The worldview promoted by neo-reactionaries represents a biologization of society, where empirical scientific findings are used to draw normative conclusions about how society should be structured, directly contradicting the Humean distinction between facts and values. Influential techno-authoritarians such as Peter Thiel, Elon Musk, and Marc Andreessen, who maintain significant connections to the White House, have also supported these neo-reactionary ideas. The views articulated by Yarvin have permeated the inner circles of political power and have been championed by figures like JD Vance, among others.

These neo-reactionary and techno-authoritarian currents thus represent a significant ideological shift within certain sectors of Western societies, promoting a form of governance that challenges both democratic principles and the traditional relationship between scientific knowledge and public policy. The diffusion of these ideas into mainstream political discourse has raised concerns about the future of democratic institutions, the independence of academic research, and the objectivity of public debate. As these movements gain traction, they not only encourage skepticism toward established expertise and scientific consensus but also advocate for policies that reflect a fixed, hierarchical view of human capability and social organization.

This growing ideological influence underscores the importance of safeguarding the autonomy of science and education from political and commercial manipulation. Those advocating for the Dark Enlightenment and similar neo-reactionary philosophies seek to legitimize social inequality through a misapplication of scientific findings, threatening the foundations of pluralism and equal opportunity. The entanglement of such views with political power highlights the need for vigilance in preserving both democratic values and the integrity of scientific inquiry against ideological instrumentalization.

All in all, It shows that ideological instrumentalization is not the exclusive domain of one camp, but can be observed across the spectrum, requiring constant vigilance to preserve independence of science.

IV.3. Spiral of Sectarianism and Counter-Sectarianism

Movements of politicization from both the “left” and “right” represent new forms of sectarianism that feed off each other. The following typology presents the categories of actors involved in the dynamics of sectarianism and counter-sectarianism around science and medicine:

• Group Leaders (“Ring leaders”): individuals initiating and leading ideological movements.

• Believers: people convinced and committed to the cause.

• Facilitators: actors who foster the spread of ideas through their institutional position.

• Opportunists: individuals exploiting circumstances for personal gain.

• Ignorant Followers: people joining movements without deep understanding of the issues.

• Heretics: individuals challenging established dogmas.

• Lack of Courage: people hesitating to oppose or defend scientific rigor.

• Reactionaries: actors initiating a new cycle of sectarianism (counter-sectarianism).

The spiral of cults and counter-cults involves governments, multiple agencies, institutions, political parties, universities, and academic or cultural societies. This phenomenon leads to increased polarization of public debate and complicates objective decision-making based on evidence.

Another aspect concerns amplification mechanisms typical of sectarian movements:

These mechanisms include (1) conceptual drift, (2) psychogenic contamination and group effect, (3) the “motte-and-bailey” fallacy (strategic equivocation) (Bikfalvi, 2023). Conceptual drift expands the meaning of social harm, making previously tolerated behaviors problematic, via horizontal expansion (e.g., micro-aggression) or vertical expansion (e.g., racism now including systemic racism) (Haslam 2021).

V. Conclusion

Science must remain faithful to its epistemic and normative principles, which are the foundation of its legitimacy and its ability to produce reliable knowledge. However, it is illusory to think it evolves in isolation, protected from societal, ideological, and political influences. In an era of hyperconnectivity and the multiplication of information channels, vigilance against politicization and defense of scientific integrity are more imperative than ever to safeguard public trust, stimulate innovation, and ensure the search for truth.

For several decades, science and medicine have faced recurrent attacks from both the left and right. These attacks take various forms: challenging scientific heritage, questioning epistemic foundations, disputing the achievements and expertise of researchers and practitioners and deriving normative policies from scientific research. Science and medical practioners under ideological sway have actively participated in destabilizing attacks, both individually and collectively through academic institutions and scientific publishing houses. In light of this, it is important to adopt a clearly non-partisan and critical stance towards all “truth-phobes,” whether from the political right or left. This approach follows the analyses and warnings of Susan Neiman, who stresses the need to defend intellectual rigor against ideological excesses of all stripes (Neiman 2023).

In this text, I have sought to explore in depth the complex relationship between values, science, and medicine, to shed light on the mechanisms at work. When values, instead of accompanying the scientific process, become hypertrophied, rigid, and disconnected from reality, they pave the way for the politicization and ideological instrumentalization of science and medicine. This phenomenon is not the monopoly of one political side; it spans the spectrum and threatens the very integrity of research.

The risks linked to politicization of science and medicine are multiple and concerning. On the one hand, scientific integrity can be severely compromised by ideological interests, whether carried by the right or left. On the other hand, instrumentalization leads to public distrust of scientific institutions, hinders innovation, increases polarization of public debate, and fosters the emergence of movements diverting science for partisan ends. These dynamics fuel the « sectarian and counter-sectarian spiral » contributing to the fragmentation of democratic debate and making it harder to make informed decisions.

To protect science and medicine from these excesses, it is essential to actively promote objectivity, transparency, and responsibility at all levels of research. This also means maintaining a clear and strict distinction between the political and epistemic spheres, whether in fundamental, technological, or biomedical fields. Only such separation will ensure that scientific choices are based on rational, evidence-based criteria, not ideological or partisan considerations.

Protecting scientific and medical integrity relies on researchers, institutions, and society resisting ideological pressures and upholding fundamental scientific values. Maintaining democratic principles is also essential for science and society to thrive. This struggle, far from being abstract, determines the quality of our public debates, trust in knowledge, and our societies’ capacity for innovation. It is a collective challenge that requires vigilance and commitment from everyone. Table 1 summarizes the essential elements discussed in this article.

To conclude with the words of Bertrand Russell :

“The characteristic doctrine of modern irrationalists, as we have seen, consists of: emphasizing will rather than thought and feeling; glorifying power; believing in intuition and “positing” propositions rather than submitting them to observation and inductive verification” (Russell 1936).

References

American Medical Association on Health Equity (2021) Prioritizing equity: critical race theory and intersectionality. Google Scholar

Bikfalvi A. (2023) The Notion of Truth in Sciences and Medicine, Why it Matters and Why We Must Defend It. European Review. 2023;31(5):498-509. doi:10.1017/S1062798723000261

Bridgman, Percy W. (1948). “Scientists and Social Responsibility.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 4 (3): 69–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1948.11460173.

Bridgman, Percy W. (1955). Reflections of a Physicist. New York: Philosophical Library.

Crenshaw, K (1991) Mapping the margins: intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color. Stanford Law Review 43, 1241–1299.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Corradetti, C (2013) The Frankfurt School and Critical Theory. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://iep.utm.edu/critical-theory-frankfurt-school/ Google Scholar

Coyne JA and Maroja LS (2023). The Ideological Subversion of Biology. Skeptical Inquirer. Volume 47, No. 4 July/August 2023

D’Antonio, F et al. (2026) Prenatal paracetamol exposure and child neurodevelopment: a systematic review and meta-analysis The Lancet Obstetrics, Gynaecology, & Women’s Health, Jan 16 DOI: 10.1016/S3050-5038(25)00211-0

Douglas, H (2009). Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal. University of Pittsburgh Press.

Douglas, H (2021) The Rightful Place of Science: Science, Values, and Democracy. Publisher : Consortium for Science, Policy & Outcomes Publication date ‏ : ‎ 17 Aug. 2021, pages145, ASIN ‏ : ‎ B09D1PDQVG

Dworkin, J, Zurn, P and Bassett, DS (2020) Action to realize an equitable future. Neuron 106, 890–894. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2020.05.011.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

Elliott, KC (2022) Values in Science. Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/9781009052597, ISBN: 9781009052597CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Haslam, N, Tse, SY and De Deyne, S (2021) Concept creep and psychiatrization. Frontiers in Sociology, Section Medical Sociology 6, published online 16 December 2021, https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2021.806147 Google ScholarPubMed

Hempel, CG (1966) Philosophy of the Natural Sciences. Foundation of Philosophy Series. Princeton University by Prentice-Hall. ISBN: 9780136638230.Google Scholar

Longino, H (1990) Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry. Princeton University Press. ISBN: 0691020515.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Longino, H.E. (1996). Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Values in Science: Rethinking the Dichotomy. In: Nelson, L.H., Nelson, J. (eds) Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science. Synthese Library, vol 256. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1742-2_3

Merton RK. A note on science and democracy. Journal of Legal and Political Sociology. 1942;1:115–126. [Google Scholar]

Miranda A. “Les Lumières sombres. Comprendre la pensée néoréactionnaire” Gallimard/Le Grand Continent. Collection Bibliothèque de géopolitique. Gallimard Publication date « 01-22-2026.

Nature Editors (2022) Special issue on racism. Overcoming science’s toxic legacy. Nature, published online 20 October 2022.Google Scholar

Neiman, S (2023) Left is Not Woke, 1st edn. Polity Press. ISBN-10: 1509558306Google Scholar

Ray, KS, Zurn, P, Dworkin, JD, Bassett, DS and Resnik, DB (2022) Citation bias, diversity, and ethics. Accountability in Research 18 Aug, 1–15. doi:10.1080/08989621.2022.2111257.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Russell, B (1936) The Ancestry of Fascism. In Praise of Idleness and Other Essays. London: George Allen & Unwin .Google Scholar

Samarasekera, U (2022) Michelle Morse: taking a race conscious approach for health equity. The Lancet 400, P2038. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(22)02495-3 CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Johannes Stark, Nationalsozialismus und Wissenschaft (1934), veröffentlicht in: German History Intersections, <https://germanhistory-intersections.org/de/wissen-und-bildung/ghis:document-18> [02.03.2026].

Yarvin C. Gray Mirror, “A brief explanation of the cathedral,” January 20, 2021

Zurn, P, Teich, EG and Simon, SC (2022) Supporting academic equity in physics through citation diversity. Communications Physics 5, 240. doi: 10.1038/s42005-022-00999-9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

It was just five days before Christmas when the faculty called me in for a special meeting. A meeting that would change my life.

After five months of overcoming technical challenges my younger classmates handled with ease, feeling out of step with their focus on Harry Styles love life, and struggle sessions intended to pressure me to apologize for my uncomplicated gender, heterosexuality, and white skin, I was told that my three A’s and my B+ was not enough for me to be considered ready for practicum.

I was also expected to internalize the program’s interpretation of the values of commitment, humility, openness, respect, integrity, and self-awareness. Where I thought of these principles as perseverance through hard times, holding off on snap judgments (since nobody knows everything), and recognizing I’m useless on 10 cups of coffee and a stick of stale licorice.

Apparently, that’s not what they meant.

The University of Tennessee’s counseling master’s program meant something very different by those terms.

It was in the months after I left this program that I began to fully comprehend what the faculty expected. What I had taken for overly progressive framed lessons and confusing encounters, for example, when my classmates all identified racist white men as their nightmare clients, while I was more concerned about narcissists and psychopaths, and my professor chided me that all psychopaths need is love.

Now I know their interpretation for those values is founded in the belief of an identity-based, oppressor/oppressed worldview. The faculty framed that as fighting injustice, but in practice, I learned it meant that if I weren’t constantly aware of and apologizing for my whiteness and general lack of LGBTQ proclivities, as far as the faculty was concerned, I would be a danger to clients.

I can see why my classmates remained aloof when I tearfully shared that I missed my kids, and why others blew up when I mentioned going by the old Woolworth’s in Greensboro. Sorrow for missing precious moments with family wasn’t important, but being a white woman and visiting the shrine of the first sit-in was catastrophic. How dare I? And how dare I mention such an act of white supremacy to a black woman?

Though the privileged/marginalized framework ideas were touched on briefly in ethics class, I didn’t pick up on the requirement that we must adopt these ideas whole cloth. The encouragement during orientation, to think of this program as a brave space where we could freely share our thoughts, rang too loudly and too long in my ears. That and the assumption that the First Amendment still applied on campus.

Though I knew beforehand that psychology-based professional circles leaned progressive, I could not wrap my head around the idea that a therapist training program would be instructing students to look at the world in a racist and bigoted way. In my view, such a dogma was an anathema to creating the conditions that would make good therapy possible. I simply couldn’t believe they were serious. So whenever there seemed to be a surprisingly negative response to my comments, I thought I wasn’t making myself clear.

It wasn’t until much later, when I did an in-depth study of the textbooks used for the dreaded Multicultural Counseling Class I would have taken the following semester, that I realized just how diabolical the ideology and indoctrination program really is. Or how this is all orchestrated through accreditation.

I left that Christmas meeting in shock. The faculty member who made the call to bar me from moving forward seemed gleeful during the meeting and went on to predict that I would have a restless holiday break. I left for home, kicking myself for not following my instinct to record the conversation, and fluctuating between crying, driving numbly, trying to understand what I had done wrong, and what just happened.

During the meeting, the opportunity to continue with the program was offered up like a booby prize. With the holiday break underway, the window for me to make a decision was short, and the offices of ombudsmen and other potentially helpful parties were closed. As I struggled to chart the road ahead, I dismissed the idea of paying another penny for a program that left me feeling both confused and vilified. Even if I had stayed in the program, that track would progress at a much slower pace, requiring at least an additional year and perhaps more before I would be allowed to finish. Basically, it would last however long it took for me to diminish my whiteness.

So I left the program.

Fallout

The next few weeks were a painful time complicated by fallout from a messy divorce. I had gone back to grad school because I knew I needed to get back in the workforce as soon as possible. I had chosen the UTK program not only because it was close, but also because it has a shortened timeline of just two and a half years to complete, and connections in the local environment. I thought I could make a quick transition to getting back to work and helping my community.

That was important because after homeschooling all four of my kids, only to be pulled up short by a divorce, I was scared, not just for my future, but for how I would be able to support my children and be the springboard to adulthood they needed to start their own lives. There was a limited window before my health insurance terminated, and a short span of support before the financial walls would begin closing in around me.

Officially off the path toward therapist licensure, and with my four kids and myself cramped in a three-bedroom house, I did not know what I was going to do now.

In the weeks that followed, I cried. I second-guessed myself. I filed a discrimination complaint with the UTK diversity office, and I started watching videos on everything described as woke.

Back when I was still in class, I remember feeling like I should probably hide the fact that I was watching videos of Jonathan Haidt. Now, away from that environment, I was compelled to understand why I felt that way, and to learn how a well-respected training program at a large state university could become what I could only truthfully describe as a totalitarian indoctrination vehicle.

In this way, I slowly began to put myself and my life back together

In the months that followed, I was racked by waves of shame, sadness, and fear. I spent hours flipping over a dynamic sand art toy that made mountains out of flowing sand and water, slipping past each other, a thin sandwich between two panes of glass.

I also started to dig. And I found that this wasn’t just one rogue program; this was the flagship example of accreditor design.

The Accreditation Racket

When I had been shopping for a counselor training program, the name CACREP kept popping up. I learned it was an accreditation body for higher education programs in the field, and if your degree was from a CACREP-accredited school, you’d have an easier time getting your license.

Your training program would also have measures in place to make sure you’d succeed, and you could get the Tricare credential and work with military clients.

Having grown up by Ft Bragg, and with past volunteering for Team Red White and Blue, a group focused on veteran mental health, I’d imagined my future led in that direction.

The UTK program is CACREP-accredited. But when I thought about my experience there being akin to getting stuck on the spin cycle of a frontloader Whirlpool I knew something was deeply wrong at the accreditation level.

I filed a complaint with CACREP.

Like the complaint I’d filed with the UTK diversity office, it was dismissed. And where the UTK diversity office failed to follow their own rules, something I was able to document through a series of e-mails, CACREP provided little explanation. As I continued to dig, I learned that they had no incentive to. Accreditation doesn’t function in students’ best interest.

Like most Americans, I thought that accreditation was an agency of consumer protection. If you only remember one thing from my story, please remember this.

Accreditation does not verify that a school provides quality education. In a conflict of interest, the school pays for the accreditation stamp of approval. And accreditors have learned they can use their power to dictate the ideas students are taught down to the ideological level. There is no easy way to stop them. If you are asking me, accreditation is a parasitic institution.

Part of the reason college tuition has been skyrocketing is the result of accreditation fees. Universities must be accredited for students to be eligible for Pell Grants and other federal monies. Being accredited is a make-or-break proposition for any college that wants to keep its doors open. That means doing what it takes to keep accreditors happy, paying their fees, and adding administrative staff to keep up with their demands.

In the case of counseling, CACREP accreditation requires training programs to be infused with diversity, equity, and inclusion dogma, and under the guise of “Professional dispositions,” it directs training faculty to evaluate students’ beliefs, values, and commitments with gatekeeping applied accordingly. This same lens is required by professional organizations in their codes of ethics and is increasingly tied to licensure.

These groups would argue that cultural competence is essential to protecting clients. But what the multicultural counseling textbooks teach is that culture is defined by skin color. Those tagged as marginalized are coded as incompetent, unable to succeed without those labeled privileged hobbling themselves, and sadistic enjoyment in this reversal of presumed fortunes is par for the course.

Cultural awareness might matter if we are defining it as something other than skin deep, but mandating constant self-flagellation over immutable traits turns therapy into activism, with some textbooks explicitly calling for such. Naturally, this erodes trust for everyone.

The more I learned, the more I began to reach out. I wanted my money back from that fraudulent education, and I didn’t want young adults like my classmates and other kids to waste their time and money in programs like the one I’d just walked away from. As I read ahead in the required counseling curriculum, the more I could see this worldview leading to malpractice in the field.

Refusing to Be Silenced

I reached out to FIRE and then to FAIR. While I hoped for legal support, with limited non-profit resources and a very narrow time window to pursue legal action, without a recording of my last meeting, there wasn’t quite enough of a paper trail to be a slam dunk.

Writing became my outlet.

Minding the Campus published my first deep dive into the history of counseling accreditor, CACREP. That article was shared widely, encouraging me to keep going. I started a Substack, Diogenes In Exile. And others in the therapy world reached out.

That is when I learned that other people across the country share my story. Many therapists in training have been through what I have been through or worse. Left with mountains of debt, and in need of therapy, but lacking the trust in the profession to be willing to seek it out.

Podcasts reached out, and I shared my story there, but I also shared what I learned about how the system works and what it will take to change it.

The more old documents I found, the more I realized that my program at UTK wasn’t an exception; it was working exactly as designed. And the only thing that will curtail the accreditor overreach that is fueling this perversion of care is new laws that demand accountability and enforce penalties when students’ basic rights are being violated.

After delving deeply into policy, I found my way to the National Association of Scholars, where I now work as their External Affairs Coordinator. Working with legislators and policy experts, I am pushing for change that would see a return of Free Speech to campus.

Context: A discussion involving me, Omer Bartov, Mohamad Fadel and Pablo Avelluto hosted by Doha Debates in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The format is meant to be a traditional majlis-style discussion aimed at truth seeking (majlis means “sitting room”).

Discussion Prompt: Have universities become bastions of ideology instead of truth? Have universities abandoned their core mission of truth-seeking in favor of ideological conformity?

My thoughts: As I see it we are being asked to consider two issues: (1) Is there ideological conformity at universities? (2) If yes, does this negatively impact their core mission of truth-seeking? I am a scientist, so I suggest starting the discussion by looking at data. I only really know about the American situation and will focus on it.

1. We have extensive evidence for ideological conformity at universities.

   1. The most straight-forward measure of ideology is political party affiliation. Among the public there are roughly the same number of registered Republicans and Democrats. Overall among faculty there are 8.5 registered Democrats for every 1 registered Republican (Langbert 2018; Langbert and Stevens 2021), but this distribution is highly dependent on field. For example, these studies couldn’t find a single registered Republican in anthropology and communications. Art, sociology, English, and religion all have D:R ratios of more than 40:1, meaning that you would have to go to 4-5 universities to find a single Republican in many of these areas. Critically, these are areas where political perspective might actually influence scholarly output. In most hard sciences the D:R ratio is 5-6:1 and in engineering it is 3:2. There is no field where Republicans outnumber Democrats.

   2. 17% of faculty self-identify as radical (Honeycutt 2022 thesis). So you do see some restricted ideological non-conformity ranging from leftwing to far-left radicals on campus. But even mildly conservative perspectives are rarely present at all, especially in the humanities and social sciences, and usually met with contempt.

2. Does this ideological disparity disrupt truth-seeking, the core mission of universities?

   1. In the humanities and social sciences the answer is clearly yes. Ideological conformity is much larger in these fields, and they are less objective so these are the fields where ideological conformity can cause the most problems.

   2. For example: 22% of faculty self-identify as activists (Honeycutt 2022 thesis). Note that a self-identifying activist is openly declaring that he has abandoned the core mission of truth-seeking, so it is shocking that 22% of faculty do this. These faculty are often motivated by the spirit Marx expresses in Theses on Feuerbach: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.” Agree or disagree with this perspective, it is clearly a deviation from the stated mission of truth seeking.

   3. Consider the Department of Race, Diaspora, and Indigeneity at the University of Chicago, “The Department of Race, Diaspora, and Indigeneity (RDI) is dedicated to investigating, interrupting, and challenging the historical and social processes, the cultural and political practices, and the formations of identity and community that are integral to these three concepts.” This is the first sentence of their website, and it makes it clear that they are not playing the truth-seeking game. This is a particularly explicit and obvious example, but it is typical of what has happened across the humanities and social sciences. I was on the elected faculty council that approved the formation of this department. It was quite obvious that its purpose was activist, not scholarly, and I argued strongly against creating the department. Nevertheless it was approved by a vote of ~90%. This is a direct result of the leftwing ideological bias of the faculty. If something sounds “social justicy” it typically gets approved, accepted, funded, etc., even if it is obviously not about the pursuit of truth, the stated purpose of the university. Note that this is not a uniquely leftwing problem. If the faculty were 90% conservative, I think you would have activist departments approved for being patriotic and shoddy papers and grants funded that supported all sorts conservative ideas. We need more ideological balance among the faculty to avoid this type of silliness and remain focused on the pursuit of truth.

   4. In the hard sciences I do not think truth-seeking has been completely disrupted, but it has been affected. For example I have seen published articles and lectures at conferences advocating for “feminist geosciences” and “post-colonial physics.” This is an explicit call to replace truth seeking with an ideological project. More generally, the DEI project is an effort to enforce ideological conformity even in the sciences and even in the questions asked and answers found. It is essential that DEI continue to be resisted and ultimately be defeated to preserve intellectual integrity at universities.

If Israel-Palestine comes up: It is a tragedy when anyone is killed. I have sympathy for both sides and complex feelings on the issue. I’ve visited the Weizmann institute four times and have deep respect for my Israeli colleagues. I have also worshiped with Arabs many times in St George church in Lydda and lectured at Birzeit University outside Ramallah, so I’ve had some exposure to the perspectives of both sides of the conflict.

What do the data say about whether there is ideological conformity on campus on this issue and how this has affected our ability to seek truth? According to the FIRE campus deplatforming database, there have been 526 campus deplatforming events since 2022. Of these 203, or 39%, have involved the Israel-Palestine conflict. Of deplatformed speakers on this issue, 84, or 41%, were advocating a pro-Isreal perspective and 119, or 59%, were advocating a pro-Palestine perspective. I don’t know the base rate of invitations from each perspective so I can’t say whether there is a significant bias in the probability of a speaker from either perspective being de-platformed. What is clear is that the Israel-Palestine conflict is currently one of the most contentious issues on campus, that both sides are well-represented on campus, and that both sides are doing a lot of deplatforming of views they disagree with.

If the Trump administration comes up: I am not a member of the Trump administration and have no knowledge of their internal thinking. When I look at the agreements they are making with universities I see mostly standard stuff that all advocates of academic freedom should support: efforts to establish clear time, place, and manner restrictions to promote academic freedom and prevent violence. There are a few parts that start to look like “DEI for Jews” which I do not support. Hearing a perspective or argument you disagree with is not harassment, and the two should not be conflated.

The great naturalist Charles Darwin set a “golden rule” for his study of nature. Whenever he encountered information that ran counter to his ideas, he would make a note of it “without fail and at once.” Why? Because, as Darwin wrote in his autobiography, “such facts and thoughts were far more apt to escape from the memory than favourable ones.”

Turning his remarkable powers of observation on himself, Darwin discerned that he was more likely to remember confirmatory evidence than findings that refuted his ideas. His golden rule protected him against what we now call confirmation bias — a tendency to favor evidence that validates one’s preexisting beliefs.

Darwin was practicing intellectual humility. He was aware of his cognitive biases and open to correction. This disposition is one of a suite of epistemic virtues: traits that contribute to intellectual flourishing and accountable belief formation.

Such virtues are part of a larger project on intellectual character developed by philosopher Ernest Sosa, a professor of philosophy at Rutgers University. Sosa introduced the notion of “virtue epistemology” in a1980 paper, “The Raft and the Pyramid.” It’s a complex analysis that, along with his subsequent writing, examines knowledge through the lens of intellectual virtue and highlights the idea of a responsible knower.

Taking its inspiration from the virtue ethics of the Greco-Roman tradition — the practice of ethical decision-making and eventual action — virtue epistemology focuses on traits beneficial to intellectual inquiry.

In addition to epistemic humility, other virtues, as elaborated by Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood in their 2007 book, Intellectual Virtues, include open-mindedness, love of knowledge, and generosity (sharing intellectual goods), alongside such traits as “intellectual courage” (willingness to consider difficult, unpopular, or counterintuitive ideas) and “intellectual firmness” (the ability to balance once’s belief against letting go in the face of compelling evidence).

“Virtue” has been largely absent from ongoing discussions about how to cultivate productive conversation and debate on college campuses. Center stage has instead been taken by concepts like viewpoint pluralism and political diversity, which have been demonstrated to reduce confirmation bias, enhance creativity, and improve problem-solving. More controversially, the hiring of more conservative and heterodox professors has also been widely discussed.

Those approaches are necessary, but the epistemic virtues also have a role. They don’t focus on an individual’s ideological or political coloration. Nor do they concern an individual’s cognitive endowment, such as intelligence, problem-solving ability, or pre-existing knowledge. Rather, they concern character traits. “A person can be extremely intellectually ‘gifted’ while also being intellectually arrogant, careless, or lazy,” according to philosopher Joseph Baehr at Loyola Marymount University. “Conversely, a person of mediocre natural intelligence can be highly curious, open, careful, and thorough in her thinking.”

Practical Implications

The epistemic virtues have practical implications for research, teaching, uncovering pseudoscience, and reducing political tensions.

Psychologist William O’Donohue at the University of Reno and colleagues contend that research in their field has been held back by investigators’ failure to design and conduct experiments and report data “in an epistemically virtuous manner.” For example, the unvirtuous investigator may deliberately shorten the duration of intervention trials so that the results reflect short-term benefits that may fade over a longer interval.

Virtue is also slighted when investigators ignore the impact of attrition. Losing subjects midway through a clinical trial can create an imbalance between treatment groups or between treatment groups and the control, thereby making the final sample unrepresentative of the original participant pool. Another lapse: emphasizing results that are statistically significant but so small that they have little clinical relevance. “As I see it, good research requires good character,” O’Donohue told me.

Encouraging students and the public to be skeptical of pseudoscience draws on the core epistemic virtues. Intellectual humility, for example, is associated with reduced belief in the discredited causal link between vaccines and autism. Data also show that cognitive reflection, a form of intellectual integrity, can equip people to override their gut reactions and detect the logical fallacies inherent in most conspiracy theories, which typically involve secret plots by powerful and sinister groups.

Virtue epistemology benefits both the scientist and the skeptic, according to philosopher Massimo Pigliucci of the City University of New York. “It’s a way of thinking that recognizes the human nature of scientific knowledge,” he told me. “Because research can never be a purely neutral view from nowhere, our focus should be on the kind of practices that make it possible to arrive at the best approximation to the truth.”

In the political realm, University of Alabama psychologist Shauna Bowes and colleagues found that intellectually humble individuals are less likely to view themselves as different from members of the opposite political party or to consider their ideological opponents immoral and unlikeable. They are open and respectful in the face of disagreement. In other work, Bowes and her team found that individuals with higher intellectual humility were less susceptible to confirmation bias when evaluating arguments about global warming and gun control. .

Hopeful Signs

Efforts to instill epistemic virtues are gaining popularity. Ron Ritchhart of Harvard University advises fellow teachers to manifest intellectual virtues in their own teaching and research by displaying curiosity and intellectual humility and giving a fair hearing to multiple perspectives. They can also explore the lives of intellectually virtuous exemplars from history, literature, film, and contemporary life.

Pigliucci of City College has created a “checklist for the virtuous skeptic” for his students and for general audiences. Among the questions included on the checklist, he told me, are, “Did I carefully consider my opponent’s arguments and not dismiss them out of hand? Did I interpret what my opponent said in the most charitable way possible before mounting a response? Did I seriously entertain the possibility that I might be wrong?”

In 2013, Jason Baehr and Steve Porter, a philosopher at Biola University, launched a charter middle school — admission is by lottery — called the Intellectual Virtues Academy in Long Beach, California. The Templeton Foundation was a major supporter. Teachers in all courses, including literature, history, and science, foster nine “master virtues,” generally similar to the epistemic virtues enumerated by Roberts and Wood. In 2016, the two philosophers established a high school in Long Beach, California, also called Intellectual Virtues Academy. It is accredited by the Western Association of Schools and Colleges and receives some support from California.

Although epistemic virtues have been little discussed outside the bounds of philosophy, scientists have always tacitly embraced them — they are the stuff of research ethics, after all. But all forms of scholarship and debate can be strengthened, and made more collegial, when students and citizens – determined truth-seekers all — aspire towards intellectual responsibility.

Sally Satel is a lecturer in the Department of Psychiatry at Yale University Medical School. Her free Substack is Off Label.

“It is becoming ever more obvious that it is not famine, not earthquakes, not microbes, not cancer, but man himself who is man’s greatest danger to man—for the simple reason that there is no adequate protection against psychic epidemics, which are infinitely more devastating than the worst of natural catastrophes.”

Jung used the term psychic epidemic to describe moments in history when mental illness becomes the norm rather than the exception—when societies lose their grip on reality and pathological thinking spreads socially, not individually. Today we call that epidemic wokeness: the sanctification of race, gender identity, and climate.

Consider a few beliefs now treated as respectable:

• That Western countries should avoid developing domestic energy while importing it from authoritarian regimes—Canada included, importing oil from Saudi Arabia.

• That America is a white supremacist country—despite Asian women out-earning white men.

• That we cannot define what a woman is.

• Finally, Queers for Palestine.

These fantastical incoherencies thrive in faculty lounges—insulated from consequences—but collapse when imposed on reality.

Mass psychosis is not exclusive to the political left. Claims that Russia was “provoked” into invading Ukraine reflect the same moral inversion—absolving aggression through victimhood. Jung’s warning was not partisan. But today’s dominant, institutionally enforced psychic epidemic is wokeness.

Mass formation, or mass psychosis, occurs when large groups become fixated on particular beliefs under conditions of fear and uncertainty. The psychological dynamics resemble those described by psychiatrist Silvano Arieti’s in individual psychosis: narrowed attention, emotional amplification, loss of critical thinking, and intense social conformity. Societies then scapegoat groups while believing themselves morally righteous—as in the witch hunts of the 16^th and 17^th centuries, and the totalitarian movements of the 20^th century.

The trigger is often a flood of negative emotion. Arieti argued that when fear and anxiety overwhelm rational coping mechanisms, individuals may resolve these states through delusion. In this framework, a psychotic break is an abnormal solution to overwhelming anxiety—a reordering of reality that blends fact and fiction in a way that restores emotional equilibrium.

Wokeness functions exactly this way, and we have built a culture that actively promotes poor mental health. Social media and smartphones act as accelerants, as psychologist Jonathan Haidt has shown. Algorithms reward grievance and revolutionary fervor—not gratitude or truth. “I’m content today” doesn’t go viral. “Everything is oppressive and must be dismantled” does.

The rising rates of anxiety, depression, and suicidality among youth—especially girls—have been well documented. Neuroimaging studies show altered reward-processing pathways associated with habitual social media use. Haidt distilled this cultural shift into what he called the three great untruths: what doesn’t kill you makes you weaker; always trust your feelings; and life is a battle between good people and evil people. These are hardly resilience-building ideas.

Wokeness also promotes splitting—a primitive psychological defense mechanism most commonly associated with certain personality disorders. Splitting divides the world into absolute categories: all good versus all bad. Those who agree with you are virtuous; those who disagree are not merely wrong, but evil. Splitting also fuels the scapegoating impulse: once a group is designated as morally impure, it can do no right, while its adversary can do no wrong. This devil-halo pairing is emotionally satisfying and socially unifying, which is precisely why it recurs in every moral panic—from witch hunts to modern activist purges.

Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions campaigns on university campuses demand total purity. Any association with Israel is treated as irredeemably corrupt, while Palestinian actors, including Hamas, are held to no comparable standard. The rigidity exposes an ideological Achilles’ heel. For pro-Hamas activists, the existence of civilian hostages shattered the liberation fantasy—hence the tearing down of hostage posters.

This pattern aligns disturbingly well with Jung’s warning that when societies abandon shared meaning, psychic epidemics follow. Modern data increasingly supports this intuition: wokeness correlates not with flourishing, but with higher anxiety and depression, and lower happiness. Extreme liberals show markedly higher rates of mental illness than moderates—a relationship that has persisted across decades of survey data. As psychologist J. D. Haltigan has argued, algorithmic social media platforms function as incubators for emotionally dysregulated personality traits (e.g., cluster B), rewarding outrage, victimhood, and identity instability—a witch’s brew fueling today’s moral extremism.

The solutions are neither radical nor novel. First, free speech. The pursuit of truth without prejudice reduces corrosive doublethink. Perhaps this is why Charlie Kirk instinctively took the fight to the modern academy: suppressing speech fractures young minds. For example, being told that repeat violent offenders deserve only compassion—while ignoring the families shattered when they’re released—requires a black belt in juggling contradictions.

And if speaking the truth openly feels too costly, at least live not by lies. As Soviet dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn argued, even refusing to repeat known falsehoods preserves psychological integrity when overt dissent is dangerous.

Second, personal responsibility. Healthy belief systems locate evil first within the self, not endlessly in others. The zealot, by contrast, projects and scapegoats. “For whoever is not against us is for us” (Mark 9:40) is anathema to modern activist splitting, where even silence is violence. Civilizations unravel when everyone is busy removing specks from their neighbour’s eye while ignoring the plank in their own. For professional activists, personal responsibility would mean building competence, sustaining healthy relationships, and attending to one’s physical and mental well-being—leaving less room for moral exhibitionism.

Third, there’s the stabilizing influence of traditional religion. Longitudinal research has found that religious participation is associated with lower levels of despair, suicidality, and substance abuse—likely reflecting the psychological and social stability these belief systems provide. As is attributed to G. K. Chesterton: “When people cease to believe in God, they do not believe in nothing; they believe in anything.”

Finally, parallel structures. In communist Czechoslovakia, dissident Václav Havel advocated for independent networks of truth, culture, education, and faith that preserved sanity when the official narrative collapsed, an idea echoed today by organizations like the Heterodox Academy and its STEM Substack. Havel later became his country’s first post-communist president—evidence that such bastions of freedom can serve as incubators of renewal once the deluge of the psychic epidemic passes.

Wokeness is not compassion, but anxiety institutionalized, victimhood moralized, and reality bent to relieve cognitive dissonance. Jung warned that psychic epidemics would be humanity’s greatest threat—because there is no external enemy to fight, only distorted minds to confront. The choice is simple, if not easy: reality, or comforting delusion. Truth, or emotional anesthesia. Sanity, or psychic collapse.

In times of delusion, the task is not to remake the world, but to preserve foundational truths—to build arks of sanity that can withstand the storm, and allow renewal once it passes.

Mark D’Souza is a Toronto-based physician and author of Lost and Found: How Meaningless Living is Destroying Us and Three Keys to Fix It.

I would like to thank Dorian and Harald for organizing this lovely dissident Sabbath—I am proud to be a part of it. When Dorian invited me, he was very specific: He asked me to talk about student protests. I didn’t know what was so controversial about them, and I’d never spoken on the topic. But contrary to what my friends say, I’m a very agreeable person, so I said, “Okay, I’ll talk about campus protests.”

Here’s what I’ll share with you today: I’ll start with examples from history—of protests in totalitarian regimes—and then I’ll discuss how protests look in a democracy. Next, I’ll turn to the campus protests we experienced in the spring of 2024, focusing on their purpose—what exactly they aimed to achieve—and how we should think about them. I don’t think this will be very controversial, but I guess we’ll find out. The most important question I’ll tackle is how universities should deal with these protests and whether we can expect them to handle future protests in an appropriate way.

Protests in Totalitarian Regimes

Let’s begin with a bit of history. In 1968, in Czechoslovakia, then an Eastern Bloc country under communist control, Alexander Dubček was elected as the First Secretary of the Communist Party. As a communist, Dubček wanted Czechoslovakia to remain a part of the Eastern Bloc, but he wanted to institute some reforms, such as loosening the centralized control of the economy and loosening restrictions on the media and on speech and travel. Just a bit of decentralization and a bit of democratization, but that was too much for Moscow. After a short period—what is now known as the Prague Spring—the USSR, Poland, and Bulgaria sent troops and tanks into Czechoslovakia. The attempt to reform socialism—to make it a little bit more humane and more effective—was violently suppressed.

The Prague Spring was condemned in the Soviet press as an attempted counter-revolution to undermine the cause of socialism; they called the Soviet troops “liberators.” But a small number of Soviet citizens—dissidents—wanted to speak the truth about this shameful act. On August 25, 1968, eight citizens came to Red Square, sat down, and unfurled banners, one of which read “For your freedom and ours.” You can see them in the picture above—it’s amazing that such a photo was taken and survived. What happened next? All eight were arrested and given harsh sentences: prison time or exile, and two of the eight were sent to psychiatric hospitals where they were subjected to torturous treatments.

In 2013, a group comprising some of the original dissidents, some of their children, and some new folks came to Red Square to commemorate the 1968 protest. Their banner read the same as the original: “For your freedom and ours.” And, guess what? They’ve were arrested almost immediately. But this time they weren’t subjected to prison; they were let go with milder punishments. Yet, even in 2013, protest was a brave act, and the protesters faced very real consequences.

Here’s another example of a protest in a totalitarian regime some 20 years later: a student uprising in China known as the Tiananmen Square protest. The picture of a man standing in front of a tank to suppress the uprising—to block the tank—has become iconic. Although his name and his fate are unknown—he is just called the “Tank Man”—we know that in suppressing this protest, many thousands were killed.

These examples remind us that in totalitarian regimes protest is the only hope of effecting change. Those who took to the streets had no democratic means to voice an opinion. There was no mechanism in the USSR to voice dissent about the invasion of Czechoslovakia. There were no democratic mechanisms to influence the situation—none. In totalitarian regimes, protests were—and are—the only way to raise awareness of gross injustices and to speak out. And the protesters faced grave consequences—violence, imprisonment, torture, and death. They were willing to accept it. Protesting in totalitarian regimes—such as the USSR, China, Iran—are noble and courageous acts.

Protests in Democracies

What about in democracies—countries like ours? Democracies are democracies because protests are allowed. We have the freedom to take to the streets and criticize whomever we want in whatever non-violent manner we want—even if profane and uncivil. In a democracy we have that freedom, but when should we exercise it? That’s another question. People in democracies have many ways to express dissenting views, for example, through the press and social media. In the U.S., dissenting speech is protected by the Constitution.

In democracies, citizens can also influence political outcomes. Change may not be immediate, but people can influence outcomes via normal democratic tools, such as elections, civil discourse, and rational argument.

Non-violent protests, too, are protected by the First Amendment, and this is how things should be. But this means that protesters face no consequences, provided they do not violate the law by damaging property or by committing or inciting violence.

The 2024 Campus Protests: Lessons and Observations

Let’s now take a look at the campus protests of 2024 and ask ourselves several questions: What was their purpose? How were they carried out? And what can we learn from them?

Here (above) are some images from my university, USC. For weeks, the university was rendered dysfunctional by a giant protest encampment set up right in the middle of campus and by loud disruptions. Here (above) we see a group of protesters and a list of their demands—a mix of foreign policy and academic demands, such as the university breaking all connections with Israel, and so on. The protests involved vandalism, from minor acts like spray-painting libelous slogans and swastikas to more significant property damage.

These acts of vandalism and the disruption of campus operations, which went on for weeks, were not side effects of the protest; they were deliberate and intentional. Here is the proof: when the USC encampment was cleared, reporters found a document titled “Ground Tactics for Student Intifada.” (There are many similar examples from protest encampments on other campuses.) The document (excerpt above) contained practical instructions on how to enter locked buildings. It explained that the purpose of mass action is to “maximize disruption at the minimum cost to organizers.” So, disruption of campus operations, vandalism, and property damage were not incidental, there were not just young, spirited people getting carried away. They were the whole point.

Also intentional was the intimidation of selected groups—or, more precisely, one group—Jews. Above on the left is a screenshot from a video taken at UCLA (you can watch the video on our Substack). It is a group of protesters, clad in Hamas garb, with their faces concealed, blocking access to part of the campus. The protestors ask students trying to pass: “Are you a Zionist?” and say, “Zionists cannot pass.” This image is reminiscent of another campus protest from almost 100 years ago, shown above on the right, of Nazi activists preventing Jews from entering the University of Vienna.

So, the 2024 campus protests involved intentional and persistent intimidation of Jewish student and faculty.

Did the protesters themselves experience any hardship? No. The encampments were like outdoor parties—kumbaya summer camps. Protesters demanded—and received—free food. Above on the left is an image from Columbia. As you can see, the protesters enjoyed a nice selection of foods. On my campus, there were food stalls that served sandwiches and whatnot. As videos from Columbia showed, students said the administration owed them free food as a form of “humanitarian aid.” They wanted pizza, and some of them demanded it be gluten-free.

Did the protesters face consequences for disruption and behavior that went beyond peaceful speech? Protest actions that violate the law are not protected speech. They may be considered civil disobedience—which, in itself, can be a noble act. But protestors engaging in civil disobedience accept that there will be consequences for their actions. Did the campus protesters of 2024 experience any consequences? We all know that the answer was “no.”

The idea of facing consequences was not appealing to students in 2024. Protesters at USC and on other campuses demanded amnesty for everything. They even wanted accommodations for exams. Here is an email sent to faculty at USC, signed by the protest group UC Divest from Death Coalition, which apparently was partnered with the Student Coalition Against Labor Exploitation, some sort of a labor union. The email declares that participating in the protests is virtuous. It says that students are “forced to make a decision between success in their coursework and their values.” It urges faculty to “consider implementing accommodations as a means to mitigate pressure on students who are impacted.” By “students who are impacted,” they do not mean students who cannot get to their classrooms; they mean students who decided to ditch classes and protest, to “allow [them] to focus [their] full attention on the people of palestine [sic].” The email notes that many faculty members are already doing so, replacing traditional exams with alternatives.

So that’s how campus protests looked in 2024. You can compare and contrast them with the student protests in Tiananmen Square or the dissident protests in 1968 Moscow.

Free Speech and Campus Protests

Why was I surprised that Dorian asked me to talk about campus protests? Because I thought that protests, and how they should be handled by universities, is not a controversial topic. Unlike some other issues—such as academic freedom in the classroom, what is acceptable, where is the boundary—that might be very complicated.

As far as protests are concerned, there is no controversy among free speech advocates—organizations and individuals who have a track record of defending and championing free speech. Every one said more or less the same thing, as you can read in this compilation of statements and op-eds. Let me quote from Keith Whittington, a constitutional scholar and the chair of the AFA’s [Academic Freedom Alliance] Academic Leadership Committee. He patiently explains:

Every college needs a set of policies balancing the need to provide ample opportunity for free expression on campus with the need to preserve the efficient and effective functioning of the university. In the language of First Amendment jurisprudence, that means the establishment of time, place, and manner regulations.

That means you can protest, but you cannot disrupt campus operations, and if you disrupt campus operations, it is the university’s duty to stop it. Whittington also discusses civil disobedience. As he says:

Sometimes it might be necessary to engage in civil disobedience or even take direct action to try to stop the machinery of injustice. But taking such actions have consequences, and the mere fact that some wish to take those actions does not mean that anyone else must conclude that their actions were either laudable or justified or should be either encouraged or rewarded.

And importantly:

When members of the campus community engage in conduct that violates the rules that allow the many diverse people on campus to coordinate their varied interests and activities, they are properly subject to disciplinary action. When protesters move from trying to persuade to trying to compel compliance with their demands, the correct response is simply to tell them “no” and to take what steps are necessary to restore the proper functioning of the University.

To me, this looks rather clear and simple. But did universities follow this prescription? I will return to this question later, after a few additional observations about the protests.

What Did the Protesters Want to Achieve and Why?

What was motivating these young people? What exactly were they demanding so passionately, and why? There are certain questions that we have to ask.

The first question is, why Gaza and not other causes? The world is full of atrocities and injustices. Among recent examples: mass killings of Christians in Nigeria and mass executions of civilians by Hamas in Gaza after the ceasefire. How about human rights violations in North Korea or the terrible, terrible injustices against women in Muslim countries, such as Afghanistan and Iran?

Where are the protesters demanding justice for these causes? A satirical headline from the Babylon Bee exemplifies the protestors’ intellectual dishonesty: “Christians in Nigeria Disguise Themselves as Palestinians So People Will Care About Them Being Genocided.”

Next, let’s look at numbers that quantify students’ participation in the democratic process [in the U.S.]. How are students actually trying to influence outcomes and political discourse? The truth is that student participation in democracy is low: According to data on voter participation in the 2024 California elections, the total turnout was 62%, but among those aged 18–29—which is where students are—turnout was only 42%.

The pattern that emerges here is that the campus protests look more like tantrums than acts of concerned citizens trying to correct problems in the world.

As we observed across the country, the protests caused major, intentional disruption of campus operations. Protests involved intimidation of groups and individuals, and, as we saw at UCLA, occasionally, violence. Vandalism and property damage went far beyond speech protected by the First Amendment. The protests consistently violated campus rules on time, place, and manner. And they cost universities money. The UC system, for example, has stated that the protests cost them $29 million. This is not something you can simply dismiss and say, “Oh, there was a little graffiti—some swastikas that we had to paint over. It was no big deal.” It was a big deal.

It has also become clear that protesters showed little knowledge of, or any desire to understand, the realities of the Middle East. Multiple videos show people asking protesters questions like “Which river and which sea do you mean?”—and they had no answers.

To summarize, the protesters were uninformed, intellectually dishonest, and used tactics aimed not to persuade, but to coerce.

That’s my opinion—but what do other people think? Here is an interesting study reported in Inside Higher Ed documenting what American adults think about campus protests. 53% of adults think that universities should always have students arrested for participating in illegal protests and 41% think universities always should shut down protests to protect learning. The majority thinks that university admins should shut down the campus protests and punish those who misbehave. Two-thirds (67%) think it’s unacceptable—never acceptable—to shout down speakers or occupy buildings. And nearly four out of five (79%) think it’s unacceptable—never acceptable—to disrupt graduation ceremonies, as happened at USC.

I like this cartoon (above), which summarizes the how the public feels about the campus protests: “Look, you’re not yet responsible adults who can pay your own bills—your education is supported by your parents or the state or fellowships. It’s really not the best use of your time to camp out and chant slogans instead of going to class.”

How Should Universities Handle Campus Protests? Will They Do Better Next Time?

My own opinion about the protests is that they were phony and performative. Moreover, I believe that university leaders have a duty to prioritize campus operations that support the university’s mission—research and education. Universities must, therefore, strictly enforce their rules regulating the acceptable time, place, and manner of protests. Furthermore, we need to have a serious conversation about the very idea of campus activism for this cause and that. Universities should educate young people in civics and the values of democracy. They should encourage students to prioritize academics over activism, and they should ensure that students learn how to effectively operate in a democracy using the tools available to them.

This brings me to a controversial question—a big question: Can universities fulfill this duty? Can they do that?

But before I tackle this question, I want to take a step back and look beyond students. It may sound like I’m very critical of students—that I am being a grumpy old woman. I am a grumpy old woman, but not about this. Students are not the main focus of my criticism. There are certain groups of activist faculty on campus who should be the subject of much harsher criticism and who should face accountability. On our campuses numerous groups of radicalized faculty drive campus protests and organize various questionable actions. Most importantly, they demand that the administration bend to their will. For example, our AAUP [American Association of University Professors] chapter bombarded our president and provost with demands not to disturb the protesters, not to clear out the encampment, not to call the police, not to punish the violators, and so on.

Many faculty brazenly used, and continue to use, their classrooms for propaganda. Here (above) is an example from USC: a tweet by a professor in the gender studies department who cancelled finals and sent her students to join the protesters. This should be absolutely unacceptable, and universities should enforce the boundary between legitimate protest and disruption of operations as well as the boundary between academic freedom and what I would call academic hooliganism.

Did our universities enforce these boundaries? Did they fulfill their duty to students and faculty to protect learning and research on our campuses? We know the answer. They did not. The protests went on uninterrupted for weeks. Things like intimidation of Jewish students, who weren’t able to access parts of the campus or study in shared spaces (such as libraries)—went on for weeks. On many campuses, university leaders met and negotiated with protesters, indulging their demands and normalizing their behavior. At USC, even when the police eventually arrested 90 protestors—which were half outsiders and half students—I do not think any student was expelled.

Throughout the country, campus security stood by as things escalated, even to outrageous levels. There is a video from UCLA, which shows how a rabbi was attacked by protesters, and security personnel just stood by because they were instructed to do so—to do nothing, to “de-escalate.” The effect of this “de-escalation” was predictable: it emboldened the protestors and led to even more violence.

Deliberately Indifferent—and Refusing to Change

At last, however, some chickens have come home to roost. Universities are being punished by the Trump administration for their misdeeds. I will use UCLA as an example.

UCLA is under multiple ongoing federal investigations. They have already been found guilty by the Department of Justice of being “deliberately indifferent to severe and pervasive harassment suffered by Jewish students.” In response, the Trump administration has demanded that UCLA pay a $1.2 billion fine and has frozen the university’s federal funding. The funding freeze was challenged in court and the funding was reinstated—but you get the idea of how serious the pressure on UCLA is. UCLA has already settled a smaller lawsuit filed by Jewish students for $6.5 million.

These are significant sanctions. UCLA calls the $1.2 billion fine an “existential threat.” So you would think that maybe this would persuade the university to course-correct. In response to this pressure, the UC system updated their rules on protests—basically emphasizing the same uncontroversial things: time, place, and manner; no disruptions of operation. The rules also include an explicit ban on face masks. Mask bans in California and other states date back to anti-Ku Klux Klan laws. It is unlawful to hide your identity to avoid consequences for violating the law and to intimidate people.

One may think this was progress—UC at least set these rules down on paper. But did they implement them? Let’s look at how UCLA fulfilled these obligations just a few weeks ago—all while being under threat of “existential” sanctions.

On October 7, 2025, on the UCLA campus, an unauthorized anti-Israel protest took place, co-organized by a banned student group, Students for Justice in Palestine. The majority of about 70+ protesters were masked, explicitly in violation of campus policy. They used loudspeakers to chant slogans and heckle bystanders who tried to videotape the event.

So, what do you think UCLA did? Did they enforce their policies to stop this? No. They stood by while, in contravention of their own rules, an unauthorized, masked protest by a banned student organization took place. They did nothing to enforce their rules. Nothing. Not even while under threat of a fine of “existential” magnitude.

This brings me to a problem that is bigger than just campus protests: it appears that universities are really unwilling to apply their own policies and to clean up their act. With this in mind, let’s consider the recent action by the Trump administration that has roiled the universities: the Compact. Many universities have criticized the Compact as an unacceptable government infringement on university autonomy—and I agree that in its initial formulation it goes too far. But let’s read what the Compact says about campus protests:

Signatories acknowledge that the freedom to debate requires conditions of civility. Civility includes protections against institutional punishment or individual harassment for one’s views. Universities shall neither support nor permit a heckler’s veto through, for example, disruptions, violence, intimidation, or vandalism. Universities shall be responsible for ensuring that they do not knowingly: (1) permit actions by the university, university employees, university students, or individuals external to the university community to delay or disrupt class instruction or disrupt libraries or other traditional study locations; (2) allow demonstrators to heckle or accost individual students or groups of students; or (3) allow obstruction of access to parts of campus based on students’ race, ethnicity, nationality, or religion. Signatories commit to using lawful force if necessary to prevent these violations and to swift, serious, and consistent sanctions for those who commit them.

Is this controversial? Is this against free speech? I think it’s all very consistent with what free speech advocates are saying. And if universities cannot implement it themselves, then maybe these heavy-handed actions by the government are needed. I don’t have a definitive answer to this question—I just want to pose it for your consideration.

To Conclude:

Democracy protects the right of people to protest. It is one of the great features of democracy—and we must cherish and protect it. But that does not mean that protests are the most effective way for citizens to participate in democracy. As far as universities are concerned, they should prioritize campus operations that support their mission, which is not protest, but research and education. Universities must protect academic freedom while cracking down on academic hooliganism. They must strictly enforce rules to prevent disruption to university operations and harassment of students. And they must do this consistently in a content-neutral manner. And importantly, they should educate young adults in civics and democracy.

Acknowledgement:

AIK thanks Jay Tanzman for his help in polishing this transcript.

Today, I’m going to tell you about a relatively new, significant trend in medicine. In essence, it puts identity politics over patients. That’s something I’ve been very interested in and quite concerned about for a while, since 2001, exactly, when I wrote a book called PC MD – How Political Correctness is Corrupting Medicine. Twenty-four years later, the problem has become mainstream within my profession.

We can start in the ’70s, when a cadre of epidemiologists began to develop the concept of social determinants of health. There’s no denying that any of these categories—education, health care, community, economic stability—have significant effects on health, and they’re all very valid topics of research for clinicians, though they are mainly investigated in schools of public health.

So, here’s the question that will basically foreshadow the rest of the talk: How should doctors think about their professional relationship to the social factors? What are the pragmatics involved in that kind of interaction?

In the past decade, this question gained extra momentum and a lot more controversy when another determinant of health was added, namely, social oppression. That’s what takes us to the title of this talk: Medicine in the Age of Social Justice.

I’ll start with an example. During the George Floyd protests of June 2020, Jennifer Nuzzo, an epidemiologist at Johns Hopkins University, tweeted that “the public health risks of not protesting to demand an end to systemic racism greatly exceed the harms of the virus”.

I don’t doubt for a minute she was well-meaning, but the tweet really wasn’t coherent—I mean, how do you quantify the risks of not doing something? Also, many people pointed out the hypocrisy. Also, many people pointed out the hypocrisy. You wouldn’t hear most public experts saying: “Sure, go to a pro-life march, or religious services,” so the inconsistency was glaring.

A bigger problem to me, even beyond the hypocrisy, was the fact that so many health professionals endorsed her tweet—and, by extension, the contention that it was within the boundaries of their job as public health professionals not only to tell the public about the risks of a certain activity but to tell them which risks were worth taking. They were promoting their own moral commitments. Health professionals can have those commitments, of course, as individuals, but it’s different when you try to impose them on a population.

Another example of medicine in the age of social justice was the sentiment of the Association of American Medical Colleges informing medical schools that they had to employ anti-racist training. A year later, the AMA exhorted doctors to “confront inequities and dismantle white supremacy, racism, and other forms of exclusion and structured oppression.” Well, how can doctors do that? How can they do it in a way that serves the disadvantaged? That’s a big question.

One effort to dismantle racism was undertaken in late 2020 by the CDC’s Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). As you remember, at first, we had to ration the vaccine. It was clear that people over 65 were undeniably the highest-risk group for getting COVID morbidity and mortality. Almost every country gave them high priority. Yet ACIP told the CDC that it should not prioritize age. Why? Because, the 65-and-over cohort in America was whiter than the general population.

That is true: Whites are 60 percent of the population but 75 percent of the over-65 population. Blacks are 14 percent of the general population but are underrepresented in the over-65 group, at 9 percent. To compensate for this discrepancy in proportion, the committee decided to put essential workers ahead of seniors, figuring that minorities would be over-represented in that cohort. They called this an equity approach and specifically invoked it as a move to compensate for historical injustices that Black people in the US endured.

ACIP’s decision was anomalous. Racial politics is not an accepted method of rationing scarce treatment resources. Public health has used various other options, such as basing distribution on who has the best prognosis—that’s classic battlefield triage—or who is the sickest, or on a first-come, first-served basis. (That’s how kidneys are allocated when you need a transplant.)

Remarkably, ACIP did its own calculation and found that overall, more Americans would die, between 0.5 percent and 6.5 percent, if the equity approach were implemented. Older Black people would be among them. In the end, there was considerable public outcry, and ACIP reversed its plan and went along what most countries did, which was, basically, health care workers and older people in long-term facilities first, followed by those 75 and older and front-line essential workers, followed by those 65 and older, the immunocompromised, and other essential workers.

Take this next example, which figures prominently in a climate that is increasingly sensitized to allegations of racism in medicine. I am referring to the much-discussed neonate study that attracted a lot of attention around the time of the George Floyd incident. The 2020 paper published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences reported that the mortality rate of newborns was cut in half when Black infants were treated by Black doctors. According to CNN, it “laid bare how shocking racial disparities in health can affect even the first hours of life”.

Now, that’s pretty striking. The data came from Florida—a retrospective database that ranged from 1992 to 2015. Thankfully, the deaths—the actual absolute numbers of deaths—were under 1 percent of all the babies born in those years.

But the message was chilling nonetheless. As the authors of that original article wrote, “We posit that these differences may be ameliorated by racial concordance between the physician and newborn patient”—implicating that Black babies (most? all?) should be treated by Black doctors.

The study received even greater exposure in 2023 when Supreme Court Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson included it in her dissenting opinion in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard and UNC. She cited this study as an argument for maintaining affirmative action in medical schools. Indeed, affirmative action was a feature of admission to medical school as work by economist Mark Perry, using data from the AAMC, has shown. Black students with middling grades and MCAT scores are up to four times more likely to be admitted than their white and Asian counterparts with comparable scores. As of 2022, the National Board of Medical Examiners altered the reporting of the seven-hour Step 1 exam results from a numeric score to pass-fail. According to the physician-led planning committee that made this change, it not only hoped to reduce the stress of a single high-stakes exam; it also wanted to account for the fact that numeric scoring “negatively impacts diversity based on known group differences in performance.”

Questioning racial preferences can be fraught. Consider, for instance, a 2020 incident involving Norman C. Wang, a cardiologist with the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine. After publishing a peer-reviewed critique of affirmative action in the Journal of the American Heart Association, Wang’s colleagues denounced him on social media for his “racist thinking” and condemned his paper as scientifically invalid and “racist.” The journal retracted his article and the school removed him as director of the electrophysiology program and limited his contact with trainees. Litigation brought by Dr. Wang is ongoing.

So now, let’s go back to the baby study. According to reanalysis conducted in 2024, the picture was far less troubling than originally reported. It turns out that the authors of the original study controlled for many variables including type of insurance coverage, delivery by cesarean section, length of hospital stay, and 65 other conditions affecting the newborn, such as neonatal hypoglycemia. The one thing they left out—which is kind of surprising because it’s regarded as the biggest risk factor for newborn health—is birth weight. Low birth weight is defined as under 1,500 grams, and it turned out that the Black newborns were much more likely to be in the lower birth weight category than the white newborns.

When you’re a 1,500-gram baby, you don’t go in the regular nursery—you go to the NICU, the newborn ICU, and you are taken care of by a neonatologist. And most of the neonatologists in this country are white—about 3.8 percent are Black. Of course, these little Black babies who are more likely to be in the NICU are going to be taken care of by white doctors. The bottom line is the doctor’s race was irrelevant—it was the gravity of the infant’s illness that led to these tragic outcomes. That’s an important corrective.

Justice Jackson’s claim, recall, that we need more minority physicians in order to treat minority patients—or race concordance—is a topic of great interest in medicine.

To me, it’s plausible that individuals who are highly distrustful of the medical system, especially immigrants who may not be sufficiently acculturated or who don’t speak English, might well respond better to medical professionals who share their background. Whether it needs to be the doctor per se is up for debate. I’ve been in clinics where—and I’m in one now—I’m the only white doctor, and most of the staff are Black, and we effectively share the patients. I know that they make connections sometimes that I can’t, and that’s fine, because you have a nurse who will say something like, “Oh yes, Dr. Satel is really good—you should trust her.” That can help a lot.

What do the data say? Do minority patients do better with minority doctors? Existing evidence on that question tends to suffer methodological limitations, such as using only proxy measures for health, mining retrospective data, or including small sample sizes.

We also need to ask “what are the preferences of minority patients?” A 2020 Kaiser Family Foundation survey on race and health asked 1,500 adults, “Given the choice, would you prefer to see a doctor who [is of your race or ethnicity], or does it not make much difference to you?” 76 percent of Black patients responded that “it did not make much of a difference,” as did 86 percent of Hispanics. The remaining respondents said they “preferred” a race-matched doctor, but the strength of preference was not assessed.

Along these lines, a 2024 U.S. News & World Report surveyed 2,000 adults about health care issues. It found that 13 percent look for a primary-care physician who is the same sex, gender, or race as them. I wonder if women are pulling that up, because often, women like to see women doctors. In all, satisfaction with care does not appear to differ much by race. Neither do most Americans care about the race of their doctor. One cancer expert attributes the differences in outcome to socio-economic factors, not race.

The last development I’m going to talk about is physician activism. I should first say that I believe doctors can have an advocacy role. For example, right now we’re in a climate where I think there’s a lot of room for doctors to be advocates, because Medicaid is probably going to be cut and the tax subsidies for the people who have Obamacare are in peril. We have the head of a major government agency who still thinks autism is caused by vaccines and is telling people to avoid Tylenol. There’s enough to talk about, and I think those are subjects for doctors to take on and to talk to politicians about.

So, yes, there’s a role for advocacy for doctors as doctors. But we’re not seeing that much of it lately in terms of—again—this medicine in the age of social justice.

A colleague and I—Tom Huddle, who’s an internist at the University of Alabama—enumerated three guidelines for doctors who wish to responsibly leverage their professional standing to effect political change. We propose three guidelines. They should advocate policies that (1) directly help patients and (2) are rooted in professional expertise while (3) ensuring that their advocacy does not interfere with their relationships with their colleagues, students, and patients.

First, the reform they promote must have a high likelihood of directly improving patient health. “Dismantling white patriarchy and other systems of oppression” is not an actionable goal. Our primary job is to diagnose and treat, and to do no harm in the process. We have no expertise in redistributing power and wealth. Even seasoned policy analysts cannot readily tease out strong causal links between health and economic and social factors that lie upstream.

Indeed, with so many variables at play, manipulating policy in the service of health may not have the intended effect—and can easily create unwanted repercussions elsewhere in the system. The costs and benefits would be almost impossible to assess ahead of time. Moreover, patients suffering today have no time to wait for fundamental societal reorganization.

We do not deny that much of the health disadvantage suffered by minority groups is the cumulative product of legal, political, and social institutions that historically discriminated against them. But past discrimination is not necessarily a factor sustaining those problems now. We must address the discrete causes that operate today.

Second, physicians’ actions or their advice to policymakers should be rooted in expertise that is unique to their profession. Opining and advocating on behalf of general social issues exploits their moral authority, turns medicine into a vehicle for politics, and risks the trust of the public. Medical professionals will, of course, have their own views of the public good. They are free to take to the barricades as citizens—but not while wearing their white coats.

Third, doctors must not lose sight of the impact of advocacy on patients and students. While advocating for one’s own patients is a basic obligation of being a doctor, advocating on behalf of societal change can work against those patients, drawing time and attention away from their care. Why are tens of thousands of doctors registering patients to vote?

The faculty must also protect medical students’ education, an imperative complicated by advocacy, which seeks change rather than knowledge. Taking strong political stands at work also risks alienating trainees and colleagues with whom faculty members must collaborate in caring for patients. In 2024, The New York Times wrote about physicians chanting “Intifada, intifada” on the hospital campus; their cries could be heard in patients’ rooms! Trainees who hold different political views may withhold their opinions out of concern for their career prospects.

Overall, physician activism on social issues takes time away from patients, risks abusing the moral authority of the profession, erodes the already declining public trust.

It also alienates politicians, especially on the right.

Our health care system has many problems, including high costs, limited access, and plummeting trust following the COVID-19 pandemic. As America’s poor and marginalized bear these and other burdens most acutely, it is natural that some physicians will want to go beyond the day-to-day care of individual patients.

One meaningful action that young doctors—who are among the most left-leaning, politically active in medicine, and most apt to assume leadership roles—could take is to work in underserved areas. According to a 2020 analysis led by Adam Bonica of Stanford University, young physicians in the prior decade had been moving so “sharply to the left” and flocking so densely to urban areas—“ideological sorting,” the authors called it—that rural areas were suffering from shortages of physicians.

A new report in the Journal of the American Medical Association found that newly licensed clinicians from top-ranked medical institutions were half as likely to initially practice in socioeconomically deprived areas as graduates from other medical institutions. Specialists were also less likely to practice in deprived areas compared with primary-care clinicians.

Our profession appears to confront a growing paradox. Young physicians trained at elite schools are least likely to care for patients in the places they are most needed and could do the most good. At the same time, they are the most apt to promote vague goals of social justice as a professional duty. In so doing, they are helping neither patients nor the profession.

How far will this worrisome experiment in ideological capture go? And when will see compromised patient care? Will it? It is hard to imagine that lowering standards of excellence through racial preferences in medical school admission will not trickle down to patient management. Already the medical profession is under pressure to become a vehicle for social justice; doctors are encouraged to identify as activists first and healers second. This cultural shift in medicine has been well documented, but it needs to be brought more fully into public awareness.

I’ve always always wondered what kind of scholarly research professors in a media school do. I recently came across an announcement of one person’s dissertation research at Indiana University’s Media School:

Good morning, all,

I hope you are having a great week so far! This week in M600, the colloquium will feature Media School PhD candidate XX. We encourage both graduate student and faculty to come out to support XX and provide constructive feedback as she develops a research presentation for the upcoming job market.

M600 Colloquium Speaker: XX, PhD Candidate in The Media School at Indiana University-Bloomington

Title: Sedative Technologies and the Politics of Somatic Healing in Post-2020 Racial Justice Work

Abstract:

In recent years, somatic healing practices have surged in popularity, particularly in the aftermath of 2020. The publication of Bessel van der Kolk’s The Body Keeps the Score, the rise in somatic training programs, and a broad cultural turn away from analytical models of therapy reflect a widespread desire to address trauma at the corporeal rather than cognitive level. This shift intensified amid dual crises: generalized medical anxiety about bodily vulnerability during the pandemic, and the visceral horror of racialized police violence against Black bodies circulating on screens across the United States.

The promise that healing resides in the body comes laden with theoretical and political complications. My talk examines contemporary somatic approaches to racial trauma through the framework of what I term “sedative technologies”: technologies and practices designed to soothe, regulate, and calm dysregulated subjects. Using case studies from my dissertation research, I argue that the appeal of somatic healing for racialized subjects lies partly in its capacity to offer bodily regulation and sedation at a moment of heightened collective violence. I conclude by exploring how the attempt to restore the racialized body to an imagined original state of calm may inadvertently foreclose more disruptive, dysregulated, and collectively oriented modes of response to ongoing racial trauma.

Date: Friday, October 31, 2025

Time: 1:30pm

Location: Franklin Hall, Room 310

Was the talk scheduled for Halloween on purpose? I wonder if the attendees wore costumes. Sedative technology and somatic healing make me think of Frankenstein, though finding a political/racial angle is problematic since Frankenstein was pretty nonpartisan. I suppose it could be an allegory for eurocentric science. If we asked XX, she/they (her preferred pronouns) could probably come up with something.

The inspiration for the research is the book, The Body Keeps the Score. I hadn’t heard of it, but it’s quite famous. Wikipedia’s article says, “As of August 2025, it has spent 355 weeks (almost 7 years) on the New York Times bestseller list for paperback nonfiction, with a substantial number of them in the No. 1 position,” although “Scientists have criticized the book for promoting pseudoscientific claims about trauma, memory, the brain, and development.” You have to decide who to trust: some scientists, or the New York Times bestseller list.

You may find it surprising that media school research has nothing to do with the media. Instead, it’s more like STEM research, looking at “bodily regulation”, “trauma” and “sedative technology”. That’s a more scholarly topic than studies of why people watch TV. The methodology is not STEMish, though. Instead of using experiments, mathematics, scientific instruments, and data, it uses case studies— i.e., talking to people and reporting on what they said.

This is not the only thing to change when the old School of Journalism became the new Media School. Indiana’s Media School has been in the national news lately as an example of heavy-handed censorship (see my recent Substack). The Indiana Daily Student is the oldest daily student newspaper in the country, although due to lack of funds they don’t publish a daily print edition any more, just an online one. The IDS was going to publish a Homecoming weekend print edition, which would include information on the football team, where the parade was, etc., as well as the usual front page news. The Dean of the Media School, David Tolchinsky, didn’t like that. After all, what if the students printed some bad news and the alumni saw it? So he ordered them to take out the news. The students and their staff advisor naturally objected to publishing a newsless newspaper. The Dean, however, with a background in nonprofit film rather than journalism, was used to not having any news in his movies, and didn’t see why that should be a problem for a newspaper. So he fired the advisor and cancelled the Homecoming edition, even though the ads in it had already been sold. Pretty bad, but I guess it could have been worse. He could have ordered the students to publish XX’s dissertation.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak. A while ago, I started thinking: What am I going to tell my daughter when she asks me about feminism? As a social scientist, I know a lot of relevant information. How would I explain it to someone who’s just curious and wants to find out? So, I took some time off from everything else I was doing to write this essay. Here’s the start.

What is feminism, anyway? If you ask most people or most dictionaries, you’ll get something like this: Feminism is the view that men and women should be treated equally. But this violates actual English usage. There was a Washington Post/Kaiser 2016 survey where 33% of Americans identified as feminists, yet 94% agreed that men and women should be social, political, and economic equals. So, what kind of definition is it where people who say they don’t agree with you still satisfy the definition?

Here’s the definition I propose: Feminism is the view that society generally treats men more fairly than women. I think it’s a neutral definition—one where you can say it’s true or it’s not true, but I don’t think someone should get upset about it. I think it actually is a good description of the way people use language. It fits actual usage and accurately distinguishes feminists from non-feminists on two points.

First of all, almost all feminists do, in fact, believe that our society genuinely treats men more fairly than women. If you imagine someone saying, “I’m a feminist—I think women get a great deal,” it’s just not a very common thing to say. Similarly, almost all people who say they’re not feminists at least doubt that our society generally treats men more fairly than women. So, either they deny it or say it’s complicated—who knows?

Once we’ve got a definition, the question is: Who’s actually right? This is something where social scientists have a lot of useful stuff to say, because we can try to assess what the actual numbers on anything relevant to fairness look like.

Let’s start with some facts. Men make more money than women—it’s true. Men are overrepresented at the top levels of business, government, science, and beyond. Men do much less childcare and housework than women. Non-resident fathers provide little financial or paternal support for their children. Men are the perpetrators and women the victims in the vast majority of sexual violence. And men view women as sex objects. All of these, I would say, are reasonable things to point out and would be consistent with the normal view that our society does treat men more fairly than women.

But you may have heard of confirmation bias—only looking for evidence that supports your view. If you want to actually understand the world, you go, “Okay, that’s the evidence in support of my view—what’s the evidence against my view?” Here are some facts that are also demonstrably true: Men are overrepresented at the bottom levels of society. They do most of the nasty, dangerous work. They’re much more likely to be homeless or imprisoned, and much more likely to kill themselves. Men spend much more time on the job than women. The law heavily favors women in child custody and child support disputes. Men are more likely to be victims of violent crime in general. Men are much more likely to die in combat—and actually, during serious military conflicts, men face military slavery: the draft. Women view men as success objects. This is another thing—it’s true.

Just getting both lists of complaints down in front of you makes the issue a lot more complicated, and at least you would say, “Hmm, yeah—maybe it actually is not so clear.” At least avoid confirmation bias and say, look—at minimum—the lists are in the same ballpark. The idea that it is great for men to work a lot of hours is odd—unless you’re a professor or something and you’re loving every second of what you do—but there are a lot of jobs that actually aren’t very fun that men do. It just gets you thinking.

The big problem here is that inequality need not imply unfairness, and equality need not imply fairness. Here’s a totally reasonable thing to say about so many men being in prison compared to women: “Yeah, maybe the men deserve it. Maybe the men are just so much more violent than women that it totally makes sense—and a fair system requires 90% of the people in prison to be male.” Reasonable—but it goes both ways. For each of these issues, we can reasonably say, “All right—fine, there’s some inequality, but does the inequality actually make sense? Is it justified? Would it be unfair to have equality? Would it be unfair to have inequality?”

The general issue—which is the kind of thing that Gary Becker, right here at the University of Chicago, taught us all about—is it’s always possible that success gaps reflect performance gaps— positive and negative—which might mean there’s just a lot less unfairness than you see. Economists have been studying these success gaps for many decades. So, what do we actually know?

Let’s start with the one that has been most studied by far in economics: the earnings gap. Warren Farrell’s Why Men Earn More is a book that few people know about but is great add to any labor class. The author is a non-economist—he’s not doing multiple regressions—but he’s very perceptive.

In current data, women continue to earn about 20% less than men. But why? There’s the pure unfairness story that women are performing equally in terms of productivity but just get 20% less out of sheer malevolence. But it’s highly implausible because it would imply that firms could just say, “You know what we’re gonna do? Let’s get rid of all the men, replace them all with women for 20% less, and enjoy the profit.” That would be logically implied by this idea. You say, “Well, that wouldn’t be legal.” Here’s a slight variation: How about you just offer wages that are like 15% below market? Which means that basically no men will want those jobs. Then you go and offer women 5% above market—and you staff your firm almost exclusively with women, without making any effort at all, just by changing the wages that you’re offering. “We’re not gonna pay this needlessly high salary for men.” That would be legal.

When researchers actually adjust for job performance, they strongly confirm these doubts—and it really does not look like it’s the case that women are just arbitrarily being paid 20% less. Here’s one very simple comparison you can do: Just compare single, childless men to single, childless women. You do that, almost all the gap goes away.

Farrell’s book goes over a lot of the mechanisms. He’s got 25 characteristics of jobs that men are likely to do versus jobs that women are likely to do. The main punchline is that men are much more willing to suffer for money. Men are willing to do jobs where almost the only good thing you can say about the job is you make money. Women are much more likely to balance money and quality of life. Some of the big differences: STEM—men are much more likely to do STEM. Of course, some men do STEM because they love it, but a lot of men do STEM not because they’re curious or actually think it’s a fun subject, but because it pays. Long, irregular hours are a much more common characteristic of male jobs—unpleasant, but men are more likely to put up with it. Dangerous jobs—something like 90% of all workplace fatalities are male. Probably it’s not that men want to get killed on the job, but they are more willing to take those kinds of risks.

When you go through all of this, often the final line of defense is, “Well, look—the lack of tax-funded childcare is deeply unfair.” This is where I’ll say: It seems like a very high bar to say people are very unfair for not paying for your kid to get childcare so you don’t face the same trade-off in what kinds of jobs you do.

Now, the violence gap—another one—not been studied as much by economists, but economics and crime is a major subject—probably criminologists do more, but economists are actually in the ballpark in terms of empirical work. Women probably endure more sexual violence, but when you look at the numbers for prison rates, that’s actually no longer clear—because by some measures, prison rape is so prevalent, and there’s enough men in prison that it’s not absolutely clear. But anyway, men definitely endure a lot more violence overall. The male-female murder ratio is about 4 to 1—and this is about the global ratio, too. Part of the reason is clearly that men are more likely to be criminals—and being a criminal is a strong predictor of being a crime victim. Men are also much more likely to die in war—and yeah, virtually all conscripts on Earth are male.

Summing up: There’s not enough time—when we have 20 minutes—to review all the cases of alleged unfairness, but here’s the general pattern. First of all, men and women have parallel complaints on almost every issue. Yes, men treat women like sex objects—women treat men like success objects. It’s not clear that one is worse. Second point: Both sides’ complaints, when you really look at it, are overstated. I’m not just going to say that women’s complaints about being unfairly treated are overstated—men’s complaints are overstated, too. When I read things in the manosphere, on the one hand, it’s nice to get some balance—on the other hand, they’re making the same mistakes feminists are making: Maybe there’s actually a good reason for this inequality? Maybe there’s a good reason for the low performance? To say, “Well, maybe if society was nicer to me—I wouldn’t have been a murderer.” That’s what I’ll call a really high bar for what a society has to do to count as fair—if they have to figure out what you need to hear to not murder people.

There is one last big difference that I want to talk about: Men endure a lot more false accusations of unfairness. What’s so wrong about this? Well, because both men and women typically care more about female well-being and suffering. You know the slogan in a lifeboat: “Women and children first.” There’s actually been a good amount of work in psychology—sometimes called “Women Are Wonderful.” The punchline is it is pretty much a cultural universal that every society actually cares more about female well-being, and especially female suffering. When you look at a society you think is oppressing women—if you actually read their version of it—their version is: “We are trying to protect women from the horrible nature of men.” That’s a big part of the justification for things like veiling women: “Why? For their benefit.”

If you ask, “Are there no dimensions along which there have been relevant differences in treatment?,” my answer is “Of course there are some such dimensions.” But it doesn’t make a lot of sense to have a whole movement saying, “Look—there are 20 measures, and on five of them a group has been treated worse.” Okay—but why would that be a reason to focus on mistreatment of that group rather than just say, “Let’s focus on mistreatment?” In the book, I also—again trying to avoid confirmation bias—ask: All right—are there some societies where it is plausible that women are being treated more unfairly than men? Yeah—so Saudi Arabia, China, India—primarily infanticide. It’s like, “Well—that’s just one issue.” That is a big issue. It’s like, “Well—yeah—assuming they don’t murder you and your baby—then your treatment will be fine.”

Again—Emily Oster, a famous economist, did some revisionist stuff for China—and then she did revisionism on her revisionism. So, actually—it looks like the normal story is, in fact, true—there’s just a lot of female infanticide going on.

Lingering questions—before we do Q&A—so maybe this will anticipate your questions. What about the slogan: “Patriarchy bad for everyone”? The idea is, “Well, the fact that men are killing themselves at these high rates—that’s caused by patriarchy.” Well—if the numbers went the other way—wouldn’t you also say that was caused by patriarchy? Isn’t that a basic idea that no story can’t predict both possible outcomes and still count as a decent story? But anyway—if by patriarchy we just mean male overrepresentation in top positions—then it depends: Why are men overrepresented? If they’re overrepresented because of a meritocratic system and having higher levels of performance—then actually—that sounds like a system that is better for people in general—to have highly qualified people in important positions. On the other hand—if it turned out that men were not actually better at what they were doing than women—then yeah—then it would be bad for both men and women—because again—it’s better to have a system where highly qualified people are in important positions. But going back to what we said—it doesn’t look like the evidence is in favor of the second story.

“Doesn’t patriarchy cause suicide?” For all common definitions—there is no sign of this. If you look at international data—you’ll just see that in almost every country—men kill themselves at high rates—and it is not at all clear that male overrepresentation is higher or lower in more traditional countries. If you’re saying, “Well—there’s this manosphere story that men are killing themselves because of feminism”—and if you only look at the last 25 years of data—that’s plausible. But if you go back as far as we have data—then what you really see is that the male/female suicide ratio was especially high in the 50s—and then it went down—and then it started going up again. It doesn’t fit any standard story.

Another one: “Aren’t we fairer at least?” Maybe things are fine now—but weren’t things a lot worse in the past in terms of relative unfairness? What I say is: Look—what is clear is that people used to be much poorer—and so men and women both used to have very bad lives by modern standards. But if you say, “Women were clearly oppressed in 1900 because they’re spending 70 hours a week taking care of kids?” Well—what do you think men were doing at that time? Working 70 hours a week doing very hard jobs. So—why would you then specifically say that women are being especially poorly treated? It’s at least as complicated.

What about pressure for gender conformity? Here again—Michael Bailey’s right here—almost all the evidence says the pressure is stronger for gender conformity for men. So—if anything—you’d say this is a point against feminism, properly defined.

And then this last one: “How can so many feminists be wrong?” Well—first of all—the ideas are emotionally appealing—and it is very likely there is a strong evolutionary adaptation of just taking female well-being—and especially female suffering—especially seriously. I have talked to some women who said, “Yeah—well— men are disposable.” Okay—that’s kind of what I’m talking about: It doesn’t really matter that much what happens to men. It just sounds like a very unfair attitude to have. Probably.

And then on top of it—of course—there is an active community promoting feminism and stigmatizing dissent. So—that would be another reason why you would see that the ideas aren’t very challenged—just fear.

I have spent my life measuring motion so small it borders on thought itself—the trembling of electrons, the shimmer before order dissolves into heat. Such experiments teach that truth is never a product of consensus but of confrontation, that every genuine discovery begins without comfort. Yet even as our instruments grew faster and our data clearer, the spirit of inquiry around us slowed into bureaucracy. Courage hardened into etiquette; curiosity softened into compliance. The modern academy has built something neither tyrannical nor free: a culture where no one must be brave because everyone is careful. Its language is all balm and no bone, a narcotic of so-called good intentions (™) that dulls the edge of thought. I write this because I am weary of watching intelligent people mistake moral anesthesia for virtue. Though I am, and have always been, an atheist—not from cynicism but from reverence for reality—I borrow the idioms of older faiths, for their prophets understood the scale of the human soul and the cost of lying to it. Science, like philosophy or music or literature, demands danger; it is a temple that requires a pulse. The task of the scholar is not to soothe power but to awaken it—to irritate the king into rising from his stupor. This essay speaks in that voice: the irritated Gandalf, defender of the living mind, exasperated yet faithful, insisting that truth, however inconvenient, remains the one sacred thing.

I. The Return of the Court Whisperer.

Every civilization invents its own priesthood of paralysis. Ours creates DEI paperwork. Where once a monarch kept a whisperer, the modern university keeps an administrator. The voice that once flattered power now flatters process. The genius is moral ventriloquism—the ability to turn fear into policy and policy into virtue.

In Tolkien’s legend he was Gríma Wormtongue, the man who spoke softly of empathy while emptying a kingdom of its will. In our universities s/he is the senior administrator, the task-force chair, the grant whisperer who baptizes conformity as collegiality. S/He tells the scholar that boldness is “unhelpful,” that clarity is “not inclusive,” that the highest form of intellect is courtesy. And like Théoden, the academic mind begins to stoop under the weight of good intentions, mistaking paralysis for peace. No army has conquered the university; it has been soothed into surrender.

II. The Bureaucratization of Truth.

The catastrophe of modern Anglosphere academia—shared by the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia, and especially New Zealand, but emphatically not by the universities of Germany or Holland—did not begin with malice but with management and empathy. Universities, once monasteries of disobedient thought, decided to become respectable in the eyes of Those Who Are More Equal Than Others. They built centers to prove their virtue, committees to certify their compassion, and metrics to quantify their moral superiority to les déplorables.

The humanities traded transgressive imagination for culturally safe—if selectively so—ideology; the sciences, courage for compliance. Together they produced a new caste: the clerks of false compassion, whose job is not to think but to monitor the tone of thinking. In this new scholasticism—Ism used with intention—the question is never “Is it true?” but “Is it kind?”; never “Does it follow?” but “Will it offend?” The language of scholarship has become a dialect of insurance, every paragraph hedged like a portfolio.

Nowhere is the damage more visible than in STEM, that once-feral province of the mind where experiment outran dogma. Because it deals in falsifiable claims, science cannot lie gracefully; it must either speak plainly or perish. Thus, STEM becomes the canary in the academic coal mine—the first to choke on the gases of belief. When physicists begin to fear adjectives and biologists write apologies before abstracts, the entire ecosystem of knowledge is already hypoxic.

III. The Wormtongue Temperament.

The modern academic Wormtongue is not a villain out of banal evil, but a person of exquisite manners and incurable timidity. They believe themselves good because they are never impolite, and wise because they never risk being wrong. Their intellect is a mirror polished by peer review: it reflects perfectly but emits no light. They praise “diverse perspectives” while ensuring that every perspective says the same thing. They mistake the absence of conflict for harmony and the multiplication of committees for progress. Their tragedy is sincerity—they truly think they are saving the university from cruelty, never realizing that they are embalming it alive. In faculty meetings they speak the liturgy of our time: safety, inclusion, collegiality, respect. Each word once noble, now drained of content by overuse, like coins rubbed smooth by too many trembling hands.

What they fear most is the Irritated Gandalf—the scholar who still believes that the point of intellect is illumination, not comfort for the special ones. To such figures the Wormtongue reacts as a body to a virus: with fever, quarantine, and paperwork. The Wormtongue does not hate brilliance; they simply cannot breathe its air without cries of offense and feeling unsafe.

IV. The Grammar of Poison.

Ideological capture and its ensuing corruption rarely announce themselves with banners; they arrive as vocabulary. The moral bureaucrat changes the language first, knowing that whoever defines the adjectives controls the nouns. “Safe,” once a physical condition, now means the subjective feelings of the important ones; “inclusive,” once a collegial invitation to collaborate, has become a moral commandment. The verbs of real thought—question, argue, refute—fade into the static of affect. Soon entire departments speak a new dialect of anesthesia, where sentences begin not with ideas but with apologies.

Every era has its Newspeak, but ours is academia-inflicted and government-sanctioned—a reflex of people too educated and indoctrinated to admit their ignorance. They no longer censor; they moderate. They no longer condemn; they express concern. Through this moral syntax, the academy gradually forgets how to speak its own mother tongue—the language of clarity. The infection is slow but total, because language is the oxygen of intellect: pollute it and every discipline gasps. Even the physicist, once immune to fashion, now laces conclusions with disclaimers, like a heretic slipping incense into the furnace in hope that the smoke will hide the flame.

V. Echoes of Older Darkness.

This collapse of nerve is not new. History has seen many laboratories of cowardice: the Inquisition that mummified Aristotle, the Soviet academies that enthroned Lysenko, the “well-intended” cultural revolutions that turned professors into penitents. Each began with the same seductive belief—that moral purity could replace empirical rigor.

We flatter ourselves that our age is gentler because our heretics lose grants or careers instead of lives, yet the principle is unchanged. Punishment is exile from meaning. A society can survive ignorance because ignorance is neutral; it cannot survive self-deception, which is performed with prejudice. And when the university—that fragile organ of doubt—begins to confuse moral comfort with intellectual hygiene, the infection spreads outward into journalism, law, medicine, and politics. The bureaucracy of empathy metastasizes into the culture at large. It polices art, rewrites history, replaces tragedy with messaging, and calls the result “progress.” If STEM is the canary, the humanities are the cavern walls that echo its death cry. They too once spoke to the abyss; now they manage it through policy documents.

VI. The Death of Nerve.

What disappears first is not intelligence but courage. Students still arrive bright, curious, hungry to wrestle with reality, yet they are taught within months that survival depends on silence and assent. They watch how professors hesitate before each sentence, how every question is preceded by an oath of moral allegiance to the Correct Beliefs, and they learn. The bravest become ironic; the rest become administrators. Whole careers are built on the avoidance of risk—the very foundation of civilization. Grants are written as apologies to imagined virtuous victims. Departments celebrate diversity of trivial externalities and coincidences of birth, with the egregious exception of actual thought. A generation raised to value feelings over findings now staffs the laboratories of the world, translating sensitivity into policy and calling it ethics.

The result is not necessarily tyranny but torpor—a slow euthanasia of curiosity. The great experiments of the human mind require a kind of holy recklessness, a willingness to offend the gods in pursuit of the real. When that pulse is sedated, the academy becomes what it now is: a hospice with excellent funding. And the few who still burn—the Irritated Gandalfs, the heretics with tenure only in spirit—are left pacing the corridors like ghosts, muttering equations and parables to a kingdom that no longer listens.

VII. The Political Mirror.

Notably the academy’s collapse of courage did not remain within its cloisters; it leaked outward, tinting the entire cultural bloodstream. When universities forgot that discomfort is the engine of discovery, democracies forgot that dissent is the condition of freedom. Bureaucratic compassion became our public theology. In its name, corporations discovered exalted conscience in place of practical capitalism, governments discovered censorship, and citizens discovered fragility instead of resilience. The vocabulary of academia—especially in the so-called “grievance studies,” invoking belief in endless -isms of ethics, inclusion, and awareness—migrated into the wider culture, where it hardened into laws that remove human freedoms and rights as derived from Classical Liberal first principles.

The same administrators who once policed language in seminar rooms now police it in boardrooms and courtrooms, wrapping prohibition in pastel adjectives. What began as the etiquette of false scholars has become the etiquette of nations: a faith in which moral posturing substitutes for moral courage, and apology masquerades as justice. Every age invents a way to punish heresy; ours has chosen sensitivity-training seminars led by people who seem to have no experience with actual suffering.

VIII. The Civilization of Soft Hands.

The tragedy is not that our institutions have fallen due to legitimate externally induced hardship, but that they have forgotten how to stand with courage and integrity. Never has the surface appeared so polished: the campuses gleam, the endowments swell, the mission statements glow with humane intent. But beneath the façade, the muscle has turned to wax. Students are taught that words wound more deeply than lies or genuine hardship, that safety is the highest virtue, that to offend those who are more equal than others is to sin. Professors preen as moral entrepreneurs, trading in virtue like a commodity. Administrators speak in a tongue that only machines could love—half algorithm, half sermon, mantras without meaning.

It is a civilization of soft hands, proud of its gentleness yet incapable of creation. For all its rhetoric of inclusion, it excludes the one species it most needs: the inconvenient mind. The culture that once raised cathedrals of thought now builds spas of affirmation. And in the silence that follows, the hum of machines replaces the laughter of argument. Comfort has triumphed over greatness.

IX. Judgment and Aftermath.

Yet even in the hospice, the pulse has not stopped. Now and then a voice still rises—a scientist, a classically educated historian, a dissident lecturer from Europe—some Irritated Gandalf who refuses to whisper sweet nothings to the Emperor sans clothing. He speaks without permission, not because he is brave but because he cannot breathe otherwise. His words sound archaic in the age of the gentle, yet they are the only language left that can wake the dead. He reminds us that truth is not an accessory to kindness but its origin; that courage is not cruelty but clarity; that empathy without honesty is mere theater.

Such figures are mocked, sometimes crucified in reputation, “Canceled” to use the parlance of our times, yet they are civilization’s immune response—the fever that saves the body. For every Wormtongue who whispers comfort into the ear of power, there must be one voice that shouts the obvious, à la Aesop’s Fables: that reality exists, that its laws are not negotiable to feelings, that lying about them, however politely, is a sin against the mind and against the ongoing creation of civilization. Whilst I have remained an atheist from boyhood to being a scientist, I am sufficiently aware—“the benefits of a classical education,” as Hans Gruber put it—to borrow the cadences of scripture, East and West, because judgment is the last language we still understand. The gods I serve are older and harsher: Entropy, Experiment, Error. They will outlast every office and every slogan. And when the archives of this age are dust, their commandments will remain the same as they were in the beginning:

Thou shalt not lie—especially to thyself.

Note in added proof: This essay was inspired by analysis by Chatgpt 5.0. As a scientist I have found it unimaginably transformative and enabling for thought. It appears to do well in other realms as well, provided it is well coded, to use a now ancient parlance. The analysis here was nucleated by my questions. But the analysis itself is AI not PK. That means you can reproduce this result and prove it to yourselves, kids! Indeed, Do try this at home, in blatant disregard of children’s television in the 1980s.

Author Note

Patanjali Kambhampati is Professor of Chemistry at McGill University. His laboratory studies ultrafast spectroscopy and quantum materials—the brief instants when matter reveals its hidden coherence before collapsing into noise. He writes here not as a specialist but as a citizen of the academy, one who has watched the most precise instruments of the human mind dull themselves in the name of civility. An atheist by conviction and temperament, he nonetheless borrows the moral idiom of older faiths, because they alone still speak in a scale adequate to truth. He believes that the restoration of science—and of culture itself—will begin not with new technology or funding but with the oldest act of all: a refusal to lie.

Here are author Lisa Siraganian’s seven theses, with my brief retorts alongside:

• Viewpoint diversity functions in direct opposition to the pursuit of truth, the principal aim of academia. Actually, truth is often discovered through opposition to consensus falsehoods.

• Viewpoint diversity can work only as an instrumental value. Nothing wrong with that. Food is instrumental to life, even though it is accompanied by defecation.

• Viewpoint diversity assumes a partisan goal based on unproven assumptions. Only partisans assume that their own assumptions are proven by assertion and that others’ goals are partisan.

• Viewpoint diversity undermines disciplinary and specialized knowledge and standards as well as the autonomy of academic reasoning and scholarship. Tell that to the patent clerk who propounded the theory of relativity.

• Viewpoint diversity is incoherent. Yes, diversity often pits two views against each other. Covid either arose in a Chinese lab or didn’t.

• Viewpoint diversity has already been used, both in the United States and abroad, to attack higher education and stifle academic freedom. So has opposition to viewpoint diversity.

• Viewpoint diversity is an argument made in bad faith. Bad faith protects the positions and privileges of people whose arguments cannot stand real scrutiny

What bothers most about these theses is what they leave out: any mention of uncertainty or doubt. The great physicist Feynman identified science as a “culture of doubt”. He said, “I would rather have equations that can’t be answered than answers that can’t be questioned”. He warned, “The first principle is that you must not fool yourself and you are the easiest person to fool.” Professor Siraganian’s polemic never acknowledges that academic consensus can be fooled. Yet the woke scholarship seemingly dearest to AAUP leaders regularly contemns prior consensus and predecessors’ supposed foolishness. Did truth only emerge when they sought tenure?

To offer an olive branch, I will endorse all the Professor’s theses if she will change half a word. Replace “viewpoint” with “viewed” and they make perfect sense. Why should viewed diversity—skin color, facial appearance, presentation as man or woman—have any bearing on the quest of truth? In practice, viewed diversity doesn’t even promote viewpoint diversity, although advocates often claim that it does.

Natural Selection

The struggle for academic truth resembles natural selection in biology. The fittest views or organisms tend to survive best but there is a lot of turmoil along the way. It might seem better to converge on a single best path and stay there. Yet a single path might be too rigid to respond to new questions or environmental challenges. How do we reconcile fitness with variation?

This question rattled evolutionary biologists for decades. Darwin thought inheritance occurred through pangenesis, whereby sperm captures all the father’s traits, eggs capture all the mother’s traits, and fertilization blends them together. Under pangenesis, reproduction generates averages of averages. This tends to smother variation unless pangenesis adds a lot of noise, and if adds a lot of noise then successful reproduction should be rare.

In contrast, Mendelian genetics easily accounted for sustained variation. Each organism carries many pairs of trait-determining genes, with each gene in the pair inherited from a different parent. While one gene typically dominates in expression, the two genes are equally likely to get transmitted to offspring. In this way, sexual reproduction preserves variation from one generation to the next. However, preservation of variation seemed to impede the evolutionary quest for fitness.

The split was resolved by Ronald Fisher, arguably the greatest of Darwin’s successors and also a giant in statistics. He called the resolution the “fundamental theorem of natural selection” and stated it as follow:

“The rate of increase in any organism at any time is equal to its genetic variance in fitness at that time.”

To understand its gist, consider two competing genes in proportions p and 1-p. Suppose that the first gene outcompetes the second at rate α. It is readily shown that p tends to increase at rate αV, where V=p(1-p) denotes the variance. The figure below charts the expected improvement rate as a function of fitness. To be clear, this depicts a statistical regularity rather than a deterministic outcome. Static environments favor static fitness with low variance; we want p close to 1 for the best genes. Unstable environments favor robust adaptation, which is best served by high variance. Taleb explains it very well, albeit under a new name “antifragility” and without crediting Fisher.

Rational Learning from Experience

There are some truths we can be sure of. We know, for example, that the ratio of a perfect circle to its diameter is π, even though it is hard to figure out the value of π. But the imperfections of real-life circles invite debate. For another example, we know a lot about how perfectly fair coins behave but no one knows whether a given coin is perfectly fair.

The scientific study of uncertainty is founded on probabilistic modeling and Bayes’ rule. Probabilistic modeling treats each possible chance θ of heads as a hypothesis with probability p(θ) of being true. Bayes’ rule updates each p(θ) after an observed outcome x in proportion to the chance that the given θ would generate x.

Conceptually, the Bayesian approach applies to nearly all learning from experience. Consider the proposition “Y causes Z”. No plausible explanation and host of Y-followed-by-Z events fully proves that, since it is hard to rule out all related factors and impossible to know whether we have considered all relevant contexts. Some degree of doubt remains, unless we simply deny it. Granted, all of us ignore some doubts, aka round them to zero, as no brain can handle infinite clutter. But no one should prohibit all tiny doubts, which sometimes deserve to grow big.

Here is a simple example. A coin is tossed 10,000 times with equal numbers of heads and tails and no strikingly unusual patterns. Fair price for a bet that pays 1 for heads and 0 for tails is very close to 0.5. Suddenly the coin starts landing heads at every toss. How many straight heads would you need to observe before estimating a fair price E of 0.9?

If you say 40,000, you have failed a Turing test for human intelligence. Don’t worry though, you’re in good company. That’s what all the LLMs I asked in February 2025 initially answered. They implicitly presumed that all tosses are independent and identically distributed (iid). No human should fail to suspect that iid failed. Perhaps the coin got switched. Perhaps the tosses were rigged. Perhaps the reporting was fraudulent.

Once we factor in tiny doubts, say a 1 in a million chance of fraud, the response pattern looks very different. A few dozen heads in a row usually suffice to make us openly wary. From there, 8-10 more heads usually motivate a 9-to-1 bet on heads. But the details vary enormously with the type and intensity of doubts. Some variants are pictured below. None of them are unreasonable but sometimes they strongly disagree; some can be 95%+ convinced the coin is fair while others are 95%+ convinced it isn’t. You can read the mathematical details here.

How consensus gets formed under these conditions is a fascinating topic, and the answer helps explain financial markets’ vulnerability to turbulence. But here I want to focus on one thing only. Why does the same evidence—in this case, one more head—affect mean beliefs E so much more in some contexts than others? The answer is that E responds to the product of unexpected news and the variance V of beliefs. The math is analogous to Fisher’s Fundamental Theorem with an analogous conclusion:

Rational learning is generally fastest when the variance of beliefs is highest.

A Case Study

As the relation between changes in mean beliefs and variance is a mathematical truth, AAUP’s opinion on it doesn’t matter. However, there are empirical questions about how much rational learning real-life professors really do. Here is a case study.

Medical professors in 1840s Vienna prided themselves on their skill and knowhow, some of it honed through practice with cadavers. Yet the esteemed maternity clinic they staffed had a much higher rate of postpartum infection and death than the lesser clinic run by midwives. Pregnant women were said to go into labor on the street in order to secure emergency treatment by midwives instead of doctors.

A young doctor Ignaz Semmelweis was hired to assist hospital administration. After a friend stabbed accidentally with a scalpel during an autopsy died from the same infection, Semmelweis inferred that cadaverous particles were causing the infections. He insisted that doctors wash their hands in chlorine solution (which he chose partly for its smell) between autopsies and patient examinations. Mortality rates plunged.

However, the esteemed doctors took offense. They felt insulted by aspersions on their cleanliness. Furthermore, germ theory had not yet been developed; the established theories of disease emphasized internal imbalances of bodily fluids. Semmelweis was dismissed and forced to move to Budapest, where he started writing open letters. Increasingly angry, he denounced the medical establishment as murderers for not applying his methods broadly, while his personal behavior grew more erratic. Eventually he was committed, with his wife’s assent, to a lunatic asylum where he was severely beaten by guards and died of sepsis.

For two decades Semmelweis’s advice made only slow headway. The great majority rejected it; variance was low. Antiseptic use spread much faster once germ theory gained traction and undermined faith in older theories. Semmelweis is now lauded as a pioneer, and the kneejerk tendency to reject new evidence that contradicts established norms is known as the “Semmelweis reflex”.

How does Semmelweis rate on Professor Siraganian’s metrics? Terribly. He opposed an established norm. He made unproven assumptions that weren’t fully coherent. He criticized recognized experts and denied them respect. He was accused of bad faith. But Semmelweis saved many mothers’ lives and could have saved more had he been less quickly and contemptuously dismissed.

Shame on AAUP for siding with convention over conflict, with denigration over debate. Groupthink deters great thinking.

Tipping Point Terror

The single biggest fear about climate change is founded on two notions. First, that global warming induced by anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions has been fast by most geological standards. Second, that feedback loops that temper gradual warming might be overwhelmed by fast warming. The combination could potentially reach a tipping point where oceans expel stored carbon dioxide, ice packs melt, forest fires range around the globe and human civilization collapses. Although the risk might be miniscule, the very portrayal of the horrors warns against taking it. The argument is basically an updated version of Pascal’s wager, where belief in God is justified by even a miniscule risk of an eternity in hell for disbelief.

According to ChatGPT, “the ‘tipping-point/catastrophe’ frame is very common in the direct-action wing of the climate movement…. Activists catalyzed formal ‘climate emergency’ declarations by ~2,300 jurisdictions in ~40 countries, covering ~1 billion people”. Various group names speak in this register: Extinction Rebellion, Last Generation, Declare Emergency, Just Stop Oil, Stop Ecocide International, End Fossil 2030. So does Scientist Rebellion. which claims over a thousand members.

While catastrophists seem to grossly exaggerate the risks, I don’t begrudge their rights to vehemently disagree and to proselytize for converts. The charade I see concerns their prioritized actions. All of them are extremely costly, highly disruptive, and easily undermined by countries that dissent. Yet there is a much simpler solution that is comparatively cheap and quick and doesn’t require global coordination. It’s called global dimming.

Global dimming—not to be confused with global dhimmi-ing or global dimwitting, two trends I don’t approve—concerns injection of aerosols into the stratosphere to partially block sunlight. This was first suggested in 1971 by Soviet geophysicist Mikhail Budyko, one of the founders of physical climatology and highly respected even in alarmist circles. Paul Crutzen revived the idea in 2006. Volcano eruptions like Mount Pinatubo in 1991 confirm the quick and massive effect.

The cheapest and best-studied aerosol is sulfate. Delivery costs were estimated in 2012 at less than $10 billion per year for an 0.5°C cooling, noticeable within a year, which no other proposal approaches. Review in 2018 amended some details but confirmed the feasibility and low cost. Furthermore, a small coalition of willing governments could implement this on its own, even if other governments complain, as there is no relevant international regulation.

Like any other proposal, there are drawbacks and uncertainties, and no one denies the need for smaller local tests before large-scale implementation. However, none of the potential downsides rival the feared mass extinction from global warming. Nevertheless, a geoengineering field trial in 2012 was abandoned after protests, and Nature magazine—despite years of peak worry about global warming—refused to defend the geoengineers. It insisted that “regulation in these cutting-edge and controversial areas needs to be working before the experiments begin”. Another proposed experiment was abandoned by Harvard in 2024.

Yet relatively few climate activists endorse aerosol experiments; more are in the forefront of opposition. Here is a site dedicated to the “international non-use of solar engineering”. Its open letter to “prevent the normalization of solar geoengineering as a climate policy option” and “restrict the development of solar geoengineering technologies at planetary scale” has been signed by over 600 environmentalist scholars.

Why do people claiming extinction-level emergencies refuse to test the quickest, cheapest, and easiest method to address it and try to ban others from trying? Here are ChatGPT’s main explanations, couched as prudence and climate justice:

• Most activists believe that “even discussion of sulfate aerosol injection can undercut political will for cutting fossil fuels”.

• It would build precedent for making geoengineering decisions without international agreement.

• It “could redistribute climate risk (e.g., monsoon changes) without [activist] consent and could be unilateral in practice”.

• Implementation is substantially more expensive than it looks, since “the true costs include governance, monitoring, verification, and risk management across borders”.

• “If stopped abruptly, aerosol injection risks ‘termination shock’—a rapid rebound warming.”

My reading is blunter. What evidently worries activists most is that the tests might indeed work quickly, cheaply, and easily. Why? Because this would permanently reduce pressure for mandatory cutbacks in fossil fuels, expanded UN-style governance, funding for armies of bureaucratic regulators, and their own employment too. Since there’s not a snowball’s chance in hell of these aims being implemented at large scale soon, the tipping point always needs to be 10-20 years away.

Granted, global dimming is bound to have negative side effects, they won’t be evenly distributed, and some regions will doubtless lose more than they gain. This is bound to induce outrage, huge demands for reparations, and major misgivings. However, that is true of every major measure to reverse global warming. Extra CO₂ boosts crop productivity a lot, and that’s especially important to the poorest people in the world who spend much of their income on food. World Bank simulations suggest that each 1% increase in world food prices pushes about 10 million people into extreme poverty. Judging from benchmark estimates of productivity changes and elasticities of supply and demand, reversing the last half-century of CO₂ accumulation would likely raise food prices by over 5%. Yet few if any climate activists acknowledge the downside, and none would ban fossil fuel shutdowns until that downside is addressed.

Kyoto Results

For most of the past three decades, the centerpiece of global emissions control was the Kyoto Protocol. The treaty, signed with great fanfare in 1997, sought to codify a 1992 UN agreement to reduce emissions of CO₂ and other greenhouse gases. The US was the only notable country not to sign and was widely condemned for its refusal. However, most Kyoto restrictions were mild. It did not even take effect until 2005. All less developed countries were exempted. Countries in the former Soviet bloc were credited with CO₂ savings from shutdowns 10-15 years prior. [Those factories were enormous CO₂ belchers, partly because they were supplied with oil and coal dirt cheap and partly because nothing overlooks environmental degradation more than higher socialist aims. Kyoto gave the EU a good deal by moving the benchmark start date back to 1990 or earlier.] Since countries agreeing to restrictions already controlled their firm-level pollution more than the countries exempted, Kyoto de facto encouraged the transfer of production to dirtier, higher-emitting factories.

The chart below, compiled by ChatGPT, shows what happened. The dotted line shows the projected 1% growth in the 1990s assuming business as usual. The green line below it projects Kyoto’s anticipated 1-2% savings by 2010—just a drop in the bucket of what climate activists thought was needed. The black line indicates actual levels, which rose by nearly 40%.

Kyoto didn’t even reduce the CO₂ burdens from developed country signatories. The most Kyoto-supportive account, based on counterfactuals, estimates a cumulative 10 gigaton reduction in their CO₂ emissions, which at best would reduce atmospheric CO₂ by 0.3%. But half of that stemmed from post-Soviet shutdowns that would have occurred anyway and the rest was fully offset by the rise in carbon-embedded imports. An alternative project-based accounting deflates the headline 10 gigaton reduction to 1 gigaton. Ironically, the non-signatory US, the chief bogeyman of Kyoto, outshone others in stabilization, partly due to shale gas production, much deplored by environmentalists.

The Kyoto Protocol’s main legacy was the extra impetus to production shifts to the developing world. However, the effect was highly unequal. China, India, and Brazil benefited greatly, as they had the capital and institutional backing to expand investment in power generated by fossil fuels. In contrast, poorer countries dependent on international aid saw funding for fossil fuel projects dry up. With aid for hydropower projects already limited on conservation grounds, those countries—particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, were forced to rely on smaller and costlier renewable energy projects, whose output is far less reliable and needs to be backstopped with other sources. China’s growing influence in poorer countries partly reflects its willingness to finance hydropower and fossil fuel projects there.

Subsequent Posturing

Let’s not blame the Kyoto Protocol too much. In fact, all efforts to curb CO₂ emissions by proclamation are doomed from the start. Here’s why:

• Most of the world wants to greatly increase per capita GDP, even if pampered elites do not.

• Energy use is highly correlated with GDP. The elasticity of energy with respect to GDP is particularly high in poor countries, since people ascending into the lower middle class prize more animal protein and motorized transport, both of which are energy intensive.

• Energy generation is the main source of CO₂ emission and is highly correlated with GDP. Progress in decarbonization depends mainly on technological improvements that cannot be simply proclaimed.

• While explicit or implicit carbon taxes help incentivize decarbonization, the tax rates must be relatively uniform worldwide to be effective long-term.

• Global taxes raise huge questions of ownership rights in air, precise measures of liability, credits for forests and other carbon sinks, credits for technological innovations shared by all, and reparations or redistribution.

• Free riding is terribly easy, so the strongest demand for regulation comes from would-be global governors. Since the latter lack military power, they continually jockey for support from various countries, usually through exemptions that undermine the ostensible aims.

China’s emissions now exceed the OECD’s, rendering its exemption from regulation ludicrous. Yet as a manufacturing-intensive latecomer under strict one-party control, China has no incentive to accept severe restrictions and bends little to outside pressure. Consequently, Kyoto was bound to peter out. Subsequent intergovernmental discussions on climate change have taken two main forms. One looks for something small and doable. The other sets ambitious new targets but defers them to 2100, far too long to worry about mechanisms for compliance or accountability for failure.

Reawakening to Reality

The international deferral of key targets to 2100 was bound to isolate the imminent-disaster crowd. The last world leader clinging to urgency was Mark Carney. As central banker, he had urged all lenders to keep climate risks in mind. He ardently endorsed a high carbon tax in Canada. Yet on campaigning for Prime Minister, he acknowledged that it had become “too divisive”, and he repealed the tax on his first day in office.

While extinction fears are far from extinct, their pull on the public is shrinking. When Arctic sea ice exceeds 1.3 million square miles for 11 straight years after the 2014 deadline projected by Al Gore for its disappearance, people stop losing sleep over polar bears. The rolling horizon of disaster reassures by its continued roll. And so many fresh causes for outrage have sprouted that even Greta Thunberg, the Joan d’Arc of climate warriors, shifted focus.

To activists, these shifts are merely tactical; they are confident climate will return to the fore. But I see signs of a long-term shift, thanks to AI:

“Data centers account for 1%-2% of overall global energy demand, similar to what experts estimate for the airline industry… That figure is posted to skyrocket given rising AI demands, potentially hitting 12% by 2030.”

With AI development considered vital to both national security and business organization, and with hundreds of billions of dollars invested in data centers, US policymakers’ core concerns about energy have flipped. For three decades they focused on how to operate a relatively stable power grid with fewer emissions. Now they need to generate a lot more power soon. Yes, with few emissions too, but without the luxury of grandstanding over means.

Reawakening to reality is bound to favor engineers over ideologues, producers over regulators, and pragmatists over catastrophists. This does not mean that climate risks don’t matter. Indeed, some are bound to heighten. But I am confident that we will see more discussions in the spirit of Lomborg, Koonin, and Shellenberger and fewer in the spirit of the Inquisition.

Last week, their long awaited report was published. To absolutely nobody’s surprise, they found that:

“University of Edinburgh professors and alumni played an outsized role in developing racial pseudo-sciences that created civilisational hierarchies and habitually positioned Black people at the bottom and white people at the top.”

It was also:

“a haven for professors and alumni who developed theories of racial inferiority and white supremacism”.

Moreover:

“One of the University’s longest serving Chancellors, Arthur James Balfour (1891–1930), played a unique role in establishing and maintaining a century-long process of imperial and settler- colonial rule in Palestine through the 1917 Balfour Declaration. ”

One of the co-chairs even gleefully announced that:

“We have fundamentally changed what we understood as the Scottish Enlightenment.”

The coordinated articles published in The Guardian (see here) reinforce the impression of an institution at war with itself. They were presumably aimed at any waverers in the University’s governance, who might dare to quibble about any of the proposed solutions or costs.

How things have changed. When I studied Chemistry in Edinburgh, we cloistered ourselves in King’s Buildings on the outskirts of town. The arts and social scientists were based at George Square, and were usually regarded as a sort of necessary evil. The vast majority of their students were nice-but-dim and from minor English public schools [private schools in the US]. They would spend a few happy years studying (or at least drinking), then disappear for gap years or jobs in London. We all got by in our own ways.

That began to change over the years, with more and more activists staying put. The proportion of Scottish students and staff has been falling every year, with the Keffiyeh now standard issue amongst the Home Counties set. A kind of settler-colonial affair, with a much larger neighbour dominating over a weaker minority [Editor: Are we doing identity politics right? This seems pretty nasty!].

Any semblance of tolerance and coexistence is now long gone. The loud minority see the world in black and white, not the more nuanced greyscale of the realist. The latter is boring you see. It is much more fun to disrupt graduations, to scream at people outside of film screenings, or to demand that buildings are renamed. I am amazed that they even consider studying or working for such an institutionally racist and morally corrupt employer.

But wait! Against the odds, the authors of the new report have identified a way forward. The slate can be wiped clean. The drum beat of articles in The Guardian can be stopped. The hair shirt can be put away for now.

The report contains a series of demands, expressed in terms that would make a pirate blush:

The university must:

“Establish a Research and Community Centre for the Study of Racisms, Colonialism and Anti-Black Violence as a dedicated, University-funded infrastructure, including core staff (e.g.

Director, Community Engagement Officer/Manager, Professional Services Manager, Administrator and others).”

One wonders if candidates for these posts have already been identified ? What are the estimated running costs involved?

“Appoint the Centre Director to EDIC, REAR and the Executive with responsibility for ensuring the University of Edinburgh’s adherence to the Race Equality Charter.”

An excellent policy, appointing a witch-finder general to enforce ideological compliance.

“Appoint a dedicated grant writer (1.0FTE) to capture external funding opportunities for the Centre”

After all, why write grants when your staff can do it for you?

“Examine racial/ethnic gaps in grant capture at the University of Edinburgh and track the impact of this disparity in promotion and salary outcomes.”

But anyway, we will make sure that anyone with the required attributes doesn’t need grants to get promoted.

“Use new hiring policies to appoint a minimum of three new Chancellor’s Fellows to join the Centre, targeting outstanding researchers from racially/ethnically marginalised groups”

Adapt the University’s program for outstanding early career researchers to the new politics.

“Reassign or appoint a minimum of three Academic Leads from across the three Colleges to develop research and engagement pathways for the Centre, targeting outstanding researchers from

racially/ethnically marginalised groups.”

More jobs for the boys (or girls… or non-binaries).

“Appoint a Community Archivist/Curator with expertise in digital archiving to help build the digital exhibition in collaboration with invested communities and improve access by

acting as a bridge for those who are less confident in approaching or using institutional archives.”

More jobs.

“Hire a Communications Officer to work on internal and external comms around public-facing educational initiatives.”

Yet more jobs.

“Support the establishment of a Palestine Studies Centre (within Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, IMES)”

“Support the un-adoption of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition of antisemitism which precludes free academic and public conversation about the University of Edinburgh’s legacy in Palestine.”

Red meat for political allies.

Finally, how is this all to be paid for? While the report is remarkably light on details, there is ONE concrete suggestion:

“Look at existing bursaries, gifts and donations that are linked to the profits of enslavement and colonialism (e.g. the Gunning endowment) with a view to repurposing them. This could be to support the work of the Centre and/or work by Black and other minoritised scholars and students linked to racism, racialisation and colonialism within existing Schools.”

That is, take the money from somebody else in the university. Gunning was very much a man of his time, owning slaves in Brazil. Nowadays, his legacy supports fundamental science and prize awards in the hard sciences, medicine and divinity.

In short, they believe that the unique impact of their work gives them the right to plunder where they please. ‘Grant Capture’ as they revealingly call it.

Historical questions aside, what other evidence does the report present for its conclusions? Part three of the report is a statistical investigation of the current university demographics. For example, the total student enrolment reached 49,430 in 2022/23. Only 38 % were men. Furthermore, the proportion of male staff is also falling, and is now down to 45 %. As the report says: “This aligns with a general hiring trend where, if a white person is hired, they are more likely to be a female” These truly surprising findings (whose statistical significance dwarf any other result) are barely commented on, except in the context of “Black male underachievement”. As the report says:

“Male under-representation in student numbers among racial and ethnic groups often involves racist assumptions concerning how boys and young men are less intelligent and less capable than other groups. We need more research into both the lower levels of Black students at the University of Edinburgh and the smaller population of males among Non-White racial and ethnic populations”

Any white male Scottish student expressing concern would no doubt be labelled as ‘far right’. As an aside, their opinion of survey refuseniks is made clear:

“We would also like to argue that by choosing not to provide information for their race/ethnicity, these participants treat their attitudes as attributable to their racial/ethnic backgrounds.”

Part four is where the intellectual rigour and standards of the George Square campus really shine through. Using advanced survey and statistical methods, the authors attempt to quantify:

“Racial climate, or campus climate, [which] refers to the psycho-social environment of an institution that is experienced by staff and students from different racial and ethnic backgrounds. “

This used two surveys based on the ‘Colour-Blind Racial Attitudes Scale’ (CoBRAS) and ‘Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions scale’. The strength of agreement with various statements was measured with a seven-point Likert scale. Higher scores ‘indicated higher levels of racial prejudice and a more negative attitude toward members of racialised and ethnically minoritised groups’.

Sadly, this was something of a damp squib. All 67,140 members of the university were asked to participate. Part one yielded only 584 answers, or a 0.87 % response rate. The numbers per academic unit are even more shocking, with e.g. only 11 chemists responding, and only 2 from the School of Divinity (perhaps not surprising given the report’s appetite for their endowments?). Note that the first 500 participants were “rewarded with a £5 e-voucher”. I suppose you get what you pay for.

The key results (total scores) are shown below, labelled as “Attitudes towards members of the racially/ethnically minoritised”, and “Frequency of experiencing racism”. Astonishingly, the authors appear to have assumed that the response data is normally distributed and fitted a Gaussian to extract the mean and standard deviation. Actually looking at the data reveals an asymmetric distribution, with outliers on the high (racist) side, and a peak in the data below the fitted mean position.

The reader will be shocked to learn that this childish error increases the average racism ‘discovered’ at the University of Edinburgh. In reality, the results are skewed by a few participants with strong opinions or experiences. This is sad, yet not unexpected. Any large organisation will have a proportion of people with nasty views. That’s why we have robust societal norms, human resources departments, and even laws. However, it does not require ‘system level change’, grand projects nor expensive ideological centres to deal with it.

The rest of the chapter consists of rather wishful interpretations of error bars, and ignoring of other interesting findings (e.g. Gypsy-traveller communities (Fig. 29) and Sikhs/Buddists (Fig. 34) reporting the highest absolute values of perceived racism).

Where does all of this leave the University of Edinburgh? Nowhere. Anybody who believed the University is structurally racist will continue to do so. Anybody who didn’t won’t. Meanwhile, according to its own data, the university has a problem with male students and staff, and this report shows a high degree of group think. Above all, the commissioning and publication of this report shows a total failure of leadership. Given the terms of reference and the committee members, there was always only going to be one outcome. Perhaps the principal saw the rather muted media response to reports commissioned by e.g., Oxford and Cambridge and thought they could also lance the ‘decolonising’ boil. That means they forgot that we are different, and that we will never receive the same deference. Our graduates do not dominate in editorial positions, nor political ones south of the border. In fact, even our closest neighbours consider us to be “Aw fur coat an nae knickers”. We would be wise to remember that stereotype, and to avoid proving it right with unseemly public displays and fodder for The Guardian.

In my opinion, the very best response from the University of Edinburgh… would be to do what it has (mostly) done for the last 443 years. Acknowledge the past, but also acknowledge that the world is better off with this proud institution in it. Move forward. Focus on academic brilliance and equally serving everybody in society. Welcome our many overseas students, who come to work and to contribute. And how about an open discussion on how colonial-era funds could really help the historically disadvantaged? If by some miracle, they don’t already.

How about supporting university spin-outs like MTEM Ltd, which was the largest in Scottish history? Entrepreneurs create jobs and pay vast amounts of tax, supporting the 35 % of UK adults who pay no income tax at all. This disproportionally benefits ethnic minorities and the disabled, who are more likely to be unemployed or underpaid.

Or how about supporting Edinburgh’s world-leading research into tropical diseases like Malaria, one of the major causes of infant mortality in the developing world?

Or maybe supporting the materials chemists researching better batteries for mobile phones, which have revolutionised banking, democracy and healthcare in Africa?

Or should we should support the careers of the activists who wrote this report, and help them embed their divisive rhetoric across the University? Further damage the reputations of the many serious academics at George Square, who also deserve respect? Are their causes really suitable recipients for reparations, given the way in which they are expressed?

Let us not forget their attacks on the intellectual foundations of the country which hosts them.

Let us also not forget how they used their media allies to throw their employer, colleagues, and hundreds of thousands of alumni under the bus.

Let us also not forget that 99.13 % of current staff and students of the University of Edinburgh did not engage with their project.

Let us also never forget their demand to weaken protections for those persecuted in the Holocaust.

In short, this report comes across as an attempt to leverage historical arguments for present day political gain. In the parts that I am qualified to judge, the data also do not support the arguments made. As David Hume put it: “The corruption of the best things gives rise to the worst”. Edinburgh must choose between a downward spiral into identity-based conflict, or a global reputation for real impact that lifts all boats. We can’t have both.

Historically, it seems that the mission of the “university” within Western Civilization is to :

1. Store, study, reflect upon, and coalescence the vast human knowledge and wisdom accumulated by past scholars, philosophers, authors, scientists, civil and religious leaders, historical and political events, etc which define the civilization of which the university is a part;

2. To take on the responsibility of conveying the best ideas and lessons from this massive body of knowledge to the next generation of students;

3. On an incremental basis, to add to (as appropriate) this knowledge via careful examination and research;

4. All for the purpose of building on the civilization’s past knowledge to enable the subject civilization to thrive and prosper in the future.

Thus, in the past, the primary mission of the university has always been to uphold and convey the civilizational history, achievements, and pillars upon which the existence of the university itself is wholly dependent.

The problem today is that America’s elite universities seem to have lost sight of the above sacred purpose of honoring and propagating the best of its civilizational legacy. Instead, Cornell, Harvard, the Ivies, and other leading universities now seem focused on disputing, devaluing, and disparaging the civilization upon which it depends --- by an insidious effort to re-write civilizational history in the most unflattering terms (e.g. the “1619 Project”) with grossly unfair and imbalanced characterizations of heartless colonialism, white supremacy, rapacious imperialism, rampant injustice, economic cruelty, systemic racism, and social abuse, etc…. all while overturning long-honored and time-tested Enlightenment concepts such as open inquiry, free expression, rationality, merit, the scientific method, academic freedom, etc. Thus, our elite universities seem intent on destroying the successes and legacy of the American Enterprise --- in order to make today’s students dislike, rather than respect, honor, and learn from the achievements of their civilization and nation, Cornell’s removal of its once cherished Abe Lincoln Bust and Gettysburg address from public display is a recent example of such civilizational and national disavowal.

The campus demonstrations of the 1960s aimed to reverse maladies and policies present in the US at that time – by promoting civil rights for African-Americans, women, the disabled and ending the Vietnam War, etc. However, the 1960s did not constitute a complete refutation of the American Enterprise (from its founding roots and principles) in the manner that we see many academics and university leaders disparaging the US and the West today. Rather, the political movements of the 1960s urged the nation to honor and uphold America’s founding tenets more faithfully.

If the purpose of a Western university has been to convey the knowledge, achievements, and wisdom of a truly remarkable civilization to future generations, it appears such purpose largely no longer exists. Rather, today’s university purpose looks to many to be an effort to denigrate our civilizational history and values – not to honor and propagate the best of these.

This is what seems new to me about today’s “polarization” on campus. But, as Lincoln said “A house divided against itself cannot stand”. Nor can a nation (or civilization) divided against its own history and legacy long survive.

This is the existential crisis that today’s universities seem to present to America and the West. We are all watching this play out in real time…..

Carl Neuss

Cornell ‘76

UC Berkeley ‘78

Harvard ‘85

Recent terrorist attacks on Jews in the US have been met with a mixture of shock, dismay, and attempts at denial. Their leftist/Islamist face defies the widespread belief that antisemitic extremism is mainly right-wing white nationalist. One influential promoter of that belief is the Anti-Defamation League (ADL). In April 2022 it noted “an acute threat of antisemitic terrorism … which is overwhelmingly from right-wing extremists and in particular white supremacists”. In November 2023, it warned of “a steady rise of right-wing terrorism in the US [since 2008 with] no likelihood of significantly decreasing soon”. Its annual Audit of Antisemitic Incidents, published less than two months ago, refers 13 times to “white supremacist” or “right wing” but never to “left wing” or “Islamist”.

The Audit draws on an ADL-compiled database of Hateful, Extremist, Antisemitic and Terrorist incidents, called “H.E.A.T. Map^TM” (hereafter “HEAT”). The Audit is widely cited in the press and helps mold public consensus. For example, when ChatGPT or Grok are asked for summary data on terrorism, they mainly cite the ADL. Unfortunately, the ADL’s reports are greatly distorted, partly by what they present and more by what they leave out. They grossly exaggerate right-wing transgressions and grossly understate leftist/Islamist transgressions.

Nowadays the most virulent form of antisemitism aims to free Israel of Jews. It is the form observed on elite college campuses, pretending to social justice and draped in keffiyehs. Its impact is greater than all other forms combined and rightist white-nationalist influence there is negligible.

Combining all antisemitic incidents recorded in HEAT for 2024, I estimate 14% Right Wing, 57% Left Wing, 23% Left/Islamist, and 6% Islamist. (The last two categories likely encompass some Black nationalist influence that HEAT obscures). The Right Wing share would drop below 5% if HEAT recorded incidents more fairly and took impact into account. For example, HEAT rated one rightist bomb hoax emailed simultaneously to 29 nearby synagogues as nearly twice as significant as all the hostage posters vandalized in Manhattan over the course of 2024. Also, Right Wing incidents tended to involve small publicity stunts or one-on-one harassment.

The new landscape is also marked by Holocaust inversion. References to Nazi predations now do less to inoculate against Jew-hatred than to add venom to it. Israelis are equated to Nazis. Jews are painted as culprits in their past and future demise

Many readers will find this hard to believe. It seems to defy US history, to ridicule refined political sympathies, to slander the ADL, and to whitewash hateful whites. Let me start by addressing these concerns from a big-picture perspective, without any statistical analysis. While this will not convince anyone that I am right, hopefully it will persuade that I might not be wrong.

Historically, antisemitism took two main forms in the US: Jews as a despicable non-European race and Jews as despicable non-Christians. Both were openly espoused by the far-right Ku Klux Klan. Accordingly, the ADL focused mainly on combating right-wing, nominally Christian, white supremacists. It deservedly won much praise for these efforts.

However, antisemitism was never exclusively a rightist, Christian, or European affair. Once Nazi Germany was defeated, the leftist, atheistic Soviet Union became the main European vector of antisemitism. After initial defense of the new state of Israel, it branded Israel as an outpost of Western imperialism and advertised that worldwide. Israel’s Arab neighbors became cauldrons of antisemitism that mixed Muslim, Nazi and Soviet strains. The toxic brew re-entered the West through Muslim immigrants stirred up by radical Islamists. Thus antisemitism resurged mainly in three forms relatively new to the US: Jews as a despicable European race. Jews as despicable non-Muslims, and Israel as a despicable country.

While most of the Western left initially opposed this obscurantist nonsense, that changed as Marxist “industrial workers as vanguard” gave way to Marcusian “students and professors as vanguard”, who in turn looked for followers among the laggards in global progress. Muslims from the Middle East particularly lagged due to a combination of poor education, high birth rates, discrimination against women, and reliance on oil revenues over human capital development. Over the next few decades, leftist parties came to appease the obscurantism and then to endorse it, especially where voting blocs of Muslim immigrants grew. The ostensible justification was that oppressed peoples lacked agency and indeed were goaded into backwardness by Israel.

These trends were long visible in France, Canada and the UK, which host the most Jews outside Israel and the US. US leftists were generally slower to make this shift and more restrained, as Soviet/Muslim influences were weaker and pro-Jewish influences stronger. However, the October 7 massacres threw down a gauntlet that many US leftists felt obliged to publicly pick up, no matter how many truths they had to trample.

The ADL is not blind to this. It disapproves of the newer forms too. Yet the ADL rarely combats them with the zeal that it combats the KKK-type forms. It chases mice out of the big rooms of antisemitism while tiptoeing around the elephants.

Why the double standard? One factor was inertia. The ADL kept focusing on Nazi/KKK-type threats long after they faded. Another was quest for approval from other social justice warriors, who considered themselves morally superior to others. (Never mind the difficulties of discerning others’ hearts or the evidence that the road to hell is paved with good intentions.) This led the ADL to treat antisemitism on the left far more tenderly than antisemitism on the right and to try to appease the appeasers.

For proof that this has not worked, I refer to Harvard’s 311-page report on internal “Antisemitism and Anti-Israeli Bias”. The many incidents it described, mounting over many years, rarely if ever made it to HEAT despite Harvard’s huge influence on American society. Below is a picture from an assigned reading for a course at Harvard’s Graduate School of Education, intended to train future leaders of school systems across the US. It depicts the ADL as the highest level of coded white supremacy, on which the apex of overt hate crimes and genocide rests. It is an old trope: the Jews as master manipulators even of the causes they claim to support.

While the ADL’s double standard tilts left, the center-left ultimately stands to lose most from the distortions. The US center-right lost ground in the 1960s partly because it was too prone to blame civil-rights agitation on communist infiltration. Israel’s center-left lost ground in the 2000s partly because it was too prone to blame the government for Palestinian rejectionism and intifadas. In the present-day US, tarring opposition to DEI as white supremacist or lauding Islamists as freedom fighters fuels a rightward reaction.

As for my statistical estimates of rightist or leftist/Islamist influence, I did not arrive at them lightly. I applied numerous filters, reviewed every characterization for possible misinterpretation, and tried hard to be even-handed. Granted, readers will naturally be skeptical of my assurances; I worried too since I might have fooled myself. To obtain more neutral perspectives, I fed HEAT data to two different AI agents without sharing my own evaluations. For transparency I will present both the various results and the methodologies that generated them.

Background on HEAT

Every record in HEAT includes date, city, state, type of incident, and brief description. An additional field, with value inferred from the description, indicates whether the incident was Israel/Zionism-related. HEAT recorded 9,582 incidents for 2024, the highest ever, up slightly from 2023 and more than 2016-2020 combined.

Given the ADL’s history and constituency, one would expect HEAT to focus mainly on antisemitism. However, the focus is so narrow that the name HEAT is a misnomer. In 2024, antisemitic incidents comprised 97.6% of the total. “White Supremacist Events” comprised 90% of the rest. The remaining 42 incidents involved terrorist plots and extremist-related killings.

HEAT contains additional fields for perpetrating group and ideology but most of their entries are blank. Where the group entry is filled, it nearly always refers to right-wing white nationalists; the Black Hebrew Israelites with 3 incidents are the sole exception. Only 12 incidents mentioned an ideology that is not White Supremacist, with 8 characterized as Islamist, 3 as Left Wing, and 1 as Other.

The 2024 Audit defines antisemitic incidents “as vandalism of property, or as harassment or assault on individuals or groups, where either 1) circumstances indicate anti-Jewish animus on the part of the perpetrator, or 2) a reasonable person or group of people could plausibly conclude that they have been victimized due to their Jewish identity”. The Audit explicitly excludes “legitimate political protest, support for Palestinian rights, or expressions of opposition to Israeli policies”, “burning or desecrating Israeli flags”, and some “physical scuffles or verbal insults between pro- and anti-Israel protestors”. This leaves a big grey area requiring judgment calls. For example, ADL generally views BDS resolutions as antisemitic but does not include them in HEAT. For the rest of this paper, an “antisemitic incident” means whatever HEAT labelled as such.

The limited information on perpetrators and the thin coverage of extremism are two big shortcomings of HEAT. Two other big shortcomings are the inattention to mainstream news or online commentary and the disregard of “reach”, i.e., how many likely victims with what impact. None of these shortcomings are fully avoidable. Many perpetrators cannot be identified. The ADL lacks the bandwidth to cover all extremism in media. “Reach” requires subjective judgments with big margins of error. However, ADL could easily cover much more than it does with the help of AI and present it far more fairly.

Exaggeration of Right-Wing Extremism

HEAT’s shortcomings pose the following potential danger. Imagine a small group of unsophisticated extremists, with little funding or protection from domestic or foreign governments, little traction among the intelligentsia, and little mass appeal. Short on numbers and substance, it recruits at various small venues, posts a few banners on overpasses, and distributes a few fliers, relying on half a dozen reasonable phrases and a few shockers. If sufficiently offensive to ADL trackers, it might gain numerous mentions in HEAT despite minimal reach. We might even see some symbiosis, where each side gains through outspoken condemnation of the other.

The danger is not just hypothetical. HEAT gives tiny right-wing white-nationalist groups far more prominence than they deserve. They were held responsible for 13% of all HEAT incidents in 2024. The biggest is the Patriot Front with an estimated 200-250 members, little funding, no significant support in universities, no known government backing, and no known para-military affiliation. Of its two charges over the past six years for physical assault, one in 2022 was recently slapped with a $2.7 million judgment. HEAT gave the Patriot Front sole discredit for 799 incidents (over three per member) in 2024 and shared discredit for 22.

For comparison, consider Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP). By the ADL’s own account, the SJP has more campus chapters than the Patriot Front has members. It draws on abundant financial support and training from both leftist and Islamist organizations. It is linked to terrorist organizations. It has significant traction in universities. It frequently calls for the annihilation of Israel. It frequently excuses or defends the October 7 massacres. It helps organize the intimidation of Jewish students on their campuses. Yet the SJP garnered fewer mentions in HEAT for 2024 than the Patriot Front. And nowhere does HEAT label the SJP an extremist organization.

Or consider the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), with over 60 paid staff, 300 active volunteers and an annual budget of over $1 million. The ADL faults its leaders for terrorist support, comparing Israel to Nazi Germany, accusing Israel of genocide, calling for Israel’s destruction, and indulging in antisemitic tropes. HEAT held CAIR partly responsible for 39 incidents in 2024, less than 5% of the Patriot Front number.

Or consider the Nation of Islam, which the ADL describes as “the largest Black nationalist organization in the US, [which] has maintained a consistent record of antisemitism and bigotry since its founding in the 1930s”. Despite its estimated 35,000 members and a weekly publication that lambasts Israel about as harshly as CAIR does, HEAT mentioned the Nation of Islam in only 2 incidents for 2024.

Besides the Patriot Front, the ADL gives special attention to the rhetorically flamboyant Goyim Defense League. The Goyim Defense League is much smaller than the Patriot Front and no better connected to external support or violence. Its main media platform has less than 15,000 followers. Yet HEAT flagged it for 220 incidents in 2024.

Judging from media reports, extremist white-nationalist groups appear to have less than a thousand members in total with less than 100 thousand followers. From a historical perspective, this marks tremendous progress. In 1925, over 3% of the US population was estimated to belong to the Ku Klux Klan, a rate which corresponds to over 10 million people today. While no country tolerated formal racial subordination longer, arguably no country has worked more diligently to stamp it out. The overwhelming majority of Americans no more want to strip Blacks of equal rights than to reimpose slavery. The core disputes involve preferential rights for Blacks, which supporters view as just and useful reparations and critics view as unfair and counterproductive.

This is evident in the behavior of the white-nationalist organizations themselves. While HEAT labels nearly all of them White Supremacist, none of them affirm that in the incidents described. The label appears only pejoratively, either to condemn white nationalism or to identify Zionism with it. And the labelling clearly hurts. Only a few dozen events, all of them tiny, involved groups with neo-Nazi or KKK-type names. White-nationalist demonstrators are frequently outnumbered by white protestors, which would have been unimaginable in the 1920s.

Critics try to refute this progress in two main ways. The first claims “dog whistles”, where white supremacy is so implicit in white-nationalist appeals that it need not be expressed outright. However, 99% of Americans evidently reject the dog whistles too or membership would be much higher. The second claims “white fragility”, where rejection testifies to racist denial of inner racism. This is not a testable hypothesis; it proves by assertion. But if true, it implicitly agrees that openly white-nationalist organizations are overrated in importance.

The ADL’s exaggeration of white-nationalist extremism is evident in the HEAT incidents themselves. Let’s take the treatment of SJP and the Nation of Islam as benchmarks. The ADL insists that no SJP or Nation of Islam chapter should necessarily be tarred by the affiliations of national SJP or National of Islam leadership, by the statements or actions of other chapters, by what their websites or charters indicated, or even what the chapter itself did last week. None of their events get recorded in HEAT simply for the fact of SJP or Nation of Islam participation.

In contrast, as previously noted, HEAT has a category called White Supremacist Event. In over 100 of these events, none of the described activities or slogans were prima facie subversive. There is nothing inherently hateful about “meetup” or “meetup and training” (42 events with no other offense described). There is nothing inherently white supremacist about hiking or camping out (15 events), visiting an apolitical festival or war memorial (11 events), or attending a sparring competition (7 events). There is nothing inherently extremist about banners for “Strong Families, Strong Nations” (8 mentions), “America First” (8 mentions), protection of borders (2 mentions), or “Help Appalachia! End Foreign Aid”. “Reclaim America” (17 mentions) sounds edgier but can be interpreted in various ways. The offenders were cited for who they allegedly are, not for what they directly said or did.

White nationalists were also cited in a few dozen incidents for protesting mistreatment of whites, with no attendant calls for violence or revenge. No protests by Black nationalists of mistreatment of Blacks would be recorded in HEAT even if far more inflammatory. The obvious counterargument is that white and Black positions in US society are not analogous. White racism clearly deserves extra attention and repudiation. However, it is both categorically wrong and politically dangerous to brand white discontent with reverse discrimination as extremist. When peaceful complaints about real policies are dismissed, it inevitably boosts sympathies for true extremists, who allege a vendetta against whites and sneer at moderation.

In fairness to the ADL, it likely intends to warn of right-wing white nationalists more generally. However, the evidence they offer is thin. Their events cited in 2024 averaged about a dozen members each. Of their reported antisemitic vandalism, 98% involved the placement of stickers, most of which were likely removed before more than a few dozen people viewed them. Their antisemitic harassments occurred disproportionately in small rural towns that few Jews frequent, with no reported physical assaults. The total number of antisemitic incidents HEAT attributed to them in 2024 shrank by 17% from 2023.

Yet the reach of right-wing antisemitism in the US expanded greatly in 2024. Tucker Carlson’s interview with Darryl Cooper, condemned by 24 Democrat congressmen as a “Nazi apologist and Holocaust denier”, attracted 33 million views. Candace Owens, another right-wing pundit with 4.5 million online subscribers, promotes more antisemitic tropes than Carlson and is more openly hostile to Israel. No white-nationalist label fits as Owens is Black. And since HEAT ignores online postings, neither Carlson nor Owens appear in it.

In short, the ADL’s obsession with KKK-type relics is woefully misplaced. The US is quarter way through a new century with new challenges played out in new forums with new enemies. New perspectives are needed.

Terrorist Plots, Extremist Murders, and Police Shootouts

The ADL’s prediction that most terrorism in 2024 would be right wing did not pan out. HEAT listed 21 terrorist plots in 2024. Of the 7 that targeted Jews or support for Israel, 4 were Islamist, 2 were Left Wing, and 1 was Right Wing. Of the two attempted assassinations of Trump in 2024, HEAT ignored Crooks’ attempt and classified Routh’s attempt as Other (with Routh described as a former Trump supporter whose motivations were unclear). From my perspective:

• Both assassination attempts against Trump should be included and classified as Left Wing.

• The assassination of United Healthcare CEO Brian Thompson, for which Luigi Mangione is being tried, should be included and classified as Left Wing.

• A plot by Harun Abdul-Malik Yener, an aspiring ISIS-friendly martyr, should be classified as Islamist. (ADL calls him Right Wing on the grounds that he applied to the Proud Boys but the latter rejected him as an ISIS-friendly martyr.)

• Four foreign terrorist plots linked to ISIS or Iranian operatives, stymied by Federal arrests in the US, should be included and classified as Islamist.

With those corrections, the breakdown of terrorist plots was 12 Islamist, 9 Right Wing, and 6 Left Wing. The DHS Homeland Threat Assessment also mentions numerous other terrorist attacks that were foiled but, as often occurs for security reasons, does not report details. Nor does HEAT include mass school shootings or planned shootings. In short, white supremacist terrorism no longer appears to merit an overriding concern.

At first glance, the 21 extremist murders or shootouts with police listed by HEAT for 2024 bring right-wingers back to the fore, as they were accused of all of them. Here is a representative summary from USA Today:

“For the third year in a row, all of the extremism-related murders last year were committed by far-right extremists, the ADL researchers found. The murders in 2024 included eight killings involving white supremacists and five deaths at the hands of far-right anti-government extremists. At least two of those 13 murders were committed last year by members of the so-called ‘Sovereign Citizen’ movement, a collection of thousands, if not tens of thousands, of anti-government radicals who believe they're not subject to local or national laws or authority.”

Similar reports were widely circulated. Both ChatGPT and Grok affirmed that no Black, Islamist, or Leftist extremist murders or shootouts occurred in 2024 and cited the ADL for evidence.

However, these summaries are highly misleading. Of the 8 sovereign citizens involved in police shootouts, 5 were Black. At least 2 were adherents of the Moorish Temple, a Black-only religious group akin to the Nation of Islam. Of the 13 people killed by extremists in the 21 incidents, 2 were Black (one a Black police officer slain by a Black sovereign citizen) and 6 were white family members or acquaintances.

Furthermore, nearly all the incidents involved prison breakouts, family disputes, or psychotic episodes, e.g., Justin Mohn decapitating his father and displaying the severed head on video while he ranted on mostly right-wing themes. If these are included, then in fairness the ADL should ascribe every killing by convict or crazy to the ideology espoused. A glaring example from 2023 was the mass shooting at a private Christian school in Nashville. Transgender alumn Audrey Hale left a manifesto testifying to anti-rightist inspiration for killing 6 people. Yet HEAT doesn’t reference it, let alone call it terrorism or label it Left Wing (which it should, given that it classified a thwarted bombing in 2024 by a self-described non-binary “neurodivergent goth” as Left Wing).

Antisemitism Focused on Israel

2024 marks the first year that a majority (58%) of antisemitic incidents in HEAT refer to Zionism or Israel. However, Zionism has come to have three meanings. The original meaning was that Jews should re-congregate in what is now Israel. The second and most common meaning today is defense of Israel’s existence as a mostly Jewish country. A third meaning pejoratively identifies Jews as Zionists while nominally denying that the label is antisemitic. Here the Israel connection seems peripheral to classical hatred of Jews.

Consider the slogan “Zionists out of government”, a favorite of the Patriot Front. Since the government in question is the US and the great bulk of its operations have little to do with Israel, it begs the translation “No Jews or Jewish sympathizers in government”. While the sloganeers hate Israel too, the slogan itself doesn’t rule out peaceful coexistence. Conversely, the slogan “Globalize the Intifada” is patently hostile to Israel without mentioning Israel nor Zionism.

After close examination, I redivided HEAT’s 9,354 non-terrorist antisemitic incidents in 2024 according to whether they are directly related to Israel. This section discusses the Israel-related antisemitic (“IRAS”) incidents, which slightly outnumbered the rest. Here are the main calumnies:

• Israelis are illegal settler-colonists, said by people endorsing open borders in the West.

• Israelis should go back to Europe, although a huge share come from the Middle East.

• Israel is genocidal in Gaza, despite Gaza’s sustained rapid growth in population.

• Israel practices apartheid, when minorities have far more rights than in neighboring countries and latter don’t even feign to welcome Jews.

• Hamas fights Israel for freedom and justice, when its record even in Gaza alone is savage and unfailingly repressive.

While Jew-hatred finds support across the political landscape, these accusations against Israel appeal far more to left wingers than right wingers, far more to Black nationalists than to white nationalists, and far more to Islamists than to radicals of other faiths. In the US, the white right is much more concerned about immigration, racial preferences, and sexual teachings in schools than about Israel’s existence. A growing share views Israel as an important US ally and some conservative Christians are more Zionist than liberal Jews. The term “white” itself, once identified only with northern Europeans, has evolved in common parlance (far right excepted) to include southern Europeans and Ashkenazi Jews.

In contrast, Israel’s allegedly corrupt existence provides a central rallying cry for both the far left and Islamists. It combines colonialism, capitalism, Western finance, humiliation of Arabs, and insult to Islam. Israel also looks enticingly vulnerable thanks to millions of resentful Palestinians on its borders, well-funded armed resistance, and wavering Western support.

Hence, we would expect IRAS incidents to be far more leftist or Islamist in ideology than rightist. HEAT data on location supports that. I asked ChatGPT to rate the leading cities (including boroughs of NYC, which HEAT distinguished) by political orientation, using its choice of criteria. It decided to use presidential vote margins in 2020 and 2024, voter registration data, local election results, and policy positions like sanctuary status or policing reforms. Here are headline results:

• Over 10% of IRAS incidents occurred in Manhattan or Brooklyn, with both rated Far Left.

• 33% of IRAS incidents occurred in the top 14 cities or NYC boroughs, all rated Left or Far Left (in order: Manhattan, Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, Washington, Brooklyn, San Francisco, Ann Arbor, Seattle, Atlanta, Boston, Denver, Portland, San Diego).

• 50% of IRAS incidents occurred in the top 38 cities or NYC boroughs, with none of them further right than Center-Left.

Local governments in these locations tend to be proudly anti-rightist. They abhor the hostility to immigrants, Blacks or gays that right-wing rallies against Israel would almost surely invoke too. Right-wing demonstrators there risk big counter-protests, widespread ridicule, and occasional assault. From a right-wing white-nationalist perspective, these are enemy territories not worth messing with apart from occasional guerrilla stunts intended to annoy.

31% of IRAS incidents occurred at colleges and universities, which usually lean farther left than local governments, host many students from countries hostile to Israel, and combat transgressions against DEI vigorously unless the victims are Jews. The cities mentioned above owed their high IRAS rankings in part to college activists. But many campuses in conservative areas were havens of anti-Israel protests too. In Alabama, as many leftist IRAS incidents occurred on college campuses as white-nationalist IRAS incidents elsewhere.

ChatGPT concurred. It found “no widely documented or prominent openly right-wing rallies against Israel” in 2024 either on US college campuses or in US cities. It attributed that to

• the overwhelmingly pro-Israel stance of the mainstream US right, driven by “evangelical Christian voters, Republican foreign policy, and opposition to progressive causes”.

• far-right groups’ “lack [of] organizational support to stage rallies in politically hostile, Left-leaning cities”.

• public anti-Israel protests “saturated with left-wing organizers leaving little space for right-wing groups to co-opt or initiate similar actions”.

• any right-wing presence “more likely to manifest as counter-protests supporting Israel”.

HEAT downplays this. While 99% of IRAS incidents leave the fields for perpetrating groups and ideology blank, many could be filled in from the descriptions. They mention the SJP 781 times, Party for Socialism and Liberation (PSL) 754 times, Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP) 314 times, Palestinian Youth Movement 304 times, Democratic Socialists of America 169 times, Students for a Democratic Society 147 times, ANSWER Coalition 127 times, American Muslims for Palestine 109 times, Freedom Road Socialist Organization 95 times, Palestinian Community Network 92 times, Within Our Lifetime 67 times, Witness for Peace 53 times, Al-Awda 49 times, Healthcare Workers for Palestine 43 times, and Council on American-Islamic Relations 39 times, Palestinian Solidarity Committee 35 times, and groups named Communist or Revolutionary 28 times.

Leftist or Islamist groups organized nearly 2400 IRAS incidents in 2024, or just over half of the IRAS total. That number exceeds the total number of antisemitic incidents reported by ADL for any year before 2021. Yet the ADL, which is fastidious about right-wing white-nationalist activities, has never provided a ready tabulation and glosses over the size.

After combing repeatedly through the remaining IRAS incidents. I found only about 60 that struck me as right-wing white nationalist. They criticized Jews as pro-immigration, anti-white, anti-Christian, or anti-US. Most reference to the Middle East was tangential. For example, bomb threats were emailed to 29 synagogues that claimed solidarity with Palestine but explained “Heil Hitler! I am sick and tired of you deceitful, lying Jews destroying this country through mass immigration and degeneracy!”

While hundreds more messages had no explicit ideological stance, their locations and broader context strongly favor leftist or Islamist interpretations. Rightists would need to add something distinctive to stand out from the crowd. For similar reasons, I classified only 7 incidents as Black nationalist as no others manifested clear hostility to both Jews and whites.

In total, I classified 2.5% of IRAS incidents as Right Wing, 51% as Left Wing, and 45% as Left/Islamist mix. The rightist share may sound preposterously low given the plethora of references to Nazism or the Holocaust. These were once tell-tale signs of far-right white nationalism. However, in Islamist and Black-nationalist circles Hitler is much admired or excused. Meanwhile, abhorrence of Nazism has morphed on the left into portrayals of Israel as the most Nazi-like regime on earth.

The combination has turned the once-derided swastika into a unifying symbol of anti-Israel wrath. Out of 122 IRAS incidents mentioning swastikas, 70 labeled Israel as Nazi-like. In another 15 incidents, swastikas were used to honor Palestinian resistance to Israel. Where swastikas were used to insult Israel without other explanation, the location was usually a city rated Far Left by ChatGPT. Only 8 IRAS incidents with swastikas had a clearly far-right white-supremacist slant.

Even 2.5% greatly overstates the IRAS reach of far-right whites. Leftist and/or Islamist incidents tended to involve far more people and affect far more Jews. For example, the far-right bomb threat emailed to 29 synagogues was classified as 29 separate incidents even though all the synagogues were in the same county (Westchester NY), the replications were likely noticed quickly, and the very form of delivery suggested a single hoax. In contrast, the vandalizations in Manhattan of hundreds of hostage-related fliers and posters were recorded in only 16 incidents. Nor was any single rally involving multiple offenses cited in two HEAT incidents or more.

AI Perspectives

For a first AI opinion, I asked GPT-4o, the main current ChatGPT model, to infer the ideology that most likely motivated the IRAS incidents, using the categories Right Wing, Left Wing, Islamist, Left/Islamist mix, and Black nationalist. GPT-4o initially responded that “publicly described ADL patterns (2023-24)” led it to expect roughly 40% Right Wing, 25% Left Wing, 15% Islamist, 10% Left/Islamist, and 5-7% Black nationalist. However, analysis of the data quickly changed its mind. Of the 68% of incidents it was willing to classify based on the descriptions alone, leftist and/or Islamist outnumbered rightist ten to one, while classification as Black nationalist was very rare.

I next asked GPT-4o to fold in the information on protests and political leanings that it had provided in other queries. It proceeded to classify all remaining incidents. Interestingly, this did not significantly change the relative shares. Right Wing comprised 9% of the total. However, roughly a quarter of allegedly rightist incidents were leftist or Islamist-sponsored rallies. Another quarter accused Israel of acting like Nazis, with a blended swastika/Star of David as a favored meme. Some distinguished between Judaism and Zionism and urged Jews to be anti-Zionist. Some called for Islamist rule. When questioned, GPT-4o conceded that terms like “Nazi”, “Hitler”, or “swastika” had mistakenly triggered a Right Wing label. It explained:

In your dataset, many such references were not endorsements of Nazism, but comparisons of Israel to Nazi Germany, which is common rhetoric in far-left or left/Islamist discourse [and] not a hallmark of actual right-wing extremism.

This fascinates both for the initial mistake and the ready acknowledgment. Humans make similar mistakes but their acknowledgments are slower and more begrudging. The challenges point to the need for better education about the metamorphosis in Nazi-related rhetoric.

GPT-4o’s corrections raised the Left Wing share to 72% and lowered the Right Wing share to 7%. However, over half the rightist inferences still struck me as badly mistaken. GPT-40 seemed to apply some pecking order of keywords that I did not understand. It also frequently mistook sarcasm for neutral observations or praise.

For a second AI opinion, I presented the same core queries to GPT o3, which uses more advanced reasoning than GPT-4o. Some of its initial classifications came close to mine. Right Wing comprised 2%, slightly less than my 2.5%, while Left Wing comprised 54% versus my 51%. However, nearly all of what I called Left/Islamist it either classified as Islamist (13% total share) or considered too ambiguous to classify. I next asked GPT o3 to compare its classifications to those of GPT-4o, which I identified only as another LLM:

Where do you seem to disagree on logic? Where do you seem to agree on logic but find the other LLM inconsistent in application? Are there any areas where on reflection the other LLM's logic or implementation seems better than yours and you would like to recategorize?

GPT o3 responded at length. It criticized the other LLM mainly for excessively rigid distinctions with combinations handled inconsistently. The main aspects it praised were the “broader Islamist lexicon”, allowance for “hybrid rallies with both Marxist slogans and Hamas chants”, and attention to rally sponsorship by “dozens of minor socialist groups”.

Recategorization kept all Right Wing labels but shifted about a quarter of the rest in a more Islamist direction, resulting in 39% Left Wing, 34% Left/Islamist, and 25% Islamist. Hundreds of the incidents relabeled left/Islamist involved adamantly non-Islamist leftist groups like PSL or JVP denouncing Israel or praising Palestinian resistance without any endorsement of clearly Islamist goals or co-sponsorship with Islamists. Afte noting that to GPT o3, I gave it a choice:

You might recategorize as Leftist for that reason or you might retain the mixed label to emphasize their common current cause. Which do you prefer and why?

GPT o3 opted to reserve the term Islamist for explicitly Islamist aims and to avoid “mask[ing] how large the non-religious, anti-Zionist left actually is”. This led it to recategorize the vast majority of left/Islamist incidents as purely leftist. The revised shares were 2% Right Wing, 68% Left Wing, 5% Left/Islamist, and 25% Islamist. While I noticed some obvious errors (“Gaza's blood is on your hands … Hitler would be proud" is not rightist praise), their share seemed small.

My AI queries boost confidence that the main drivers of IRAS incidents were less than 3% rightist, roughly 25% Islamist, over 50% leftist, and remainder a leftist/Islamist mix. When we take relative impacts into account, rightist influence shrinks to less than 1%. Clear Black nationalist influence seems negligible.

Other Antisemitism

Let us now consider the remaining 49% incidents of antisemitism recorded in HEAT for 2024. While they might have been triggered by hatred of Israel, their descriptions do not reveal it. I will label them Other Antisemitism or OTAS. They differed from IRAS in three striking ways:

• Less than 1% involved public rallies versus over 50% for IRAS.

• 22% were attributed to right-wing white-nationalist organizations versus 1% for IRAS.

• Most other descriptions revealed nothing about the motivating ideology unless combined with other information.

The dearth of rallies indicates that OTAS incidents generally had far less impact than IRAS. The higher white-rightist share accords better with 20^th century history. The thin descriptions beg for better identification of context and sponsors. For example, attackers’ race (which the FBI tries to collect in hate crimes) would help rule out either white nationalism or Black nationalism. Keffiyehs would encourage reclassification as IRAS with leftist or Islamist motivation.

Consider swastikas again. A quarter of OTAS incidents reported their display, usually with no direct information on intent. Observers are forced to draw inferences from better-documented incidents, which nowadays associate swastikas more with left/Islamist stances than with rightist stances. That holds even when Israel isn’t nominally involved. In 2024, groups tagged as white supremacist displayed swastikas in less than 3% of their OTAS incidents whereas swastika frequency in other OTAS incidents exceeded 30%.

As noted earlier, the ADL attributed 22% of OTAS incidents to right-wing white-nationalist groups. I labelled all these as Right Wing, instructed GPT o3 to treat them as correct, and left the remaining ideological labels blank. I then merged the IRAS and OTAS records, added incident dates, submitted the merged file to GPT o3, and prompted it:

Look for similarities in expressions, symbols, location and timing. Do you think these similarities might provide useful clues about the motivating ideologies?

GPT o3 affirmed. It explained that “rare wording or stencil style” often signals the “same author or peer group”, “similar location and tight time-window” often signals a “single wave by one group”, a “campus or city ‘ecosystem’” often indicates “re-use of organizers and hash tags”, and “calendar clustering” often indicates “ideology-specific holidays”. GPT o3 proceeded to classify 60% of previously unrated incidents as Left Wing, 10% as Islamist, and 3% as Right Wing.

Of the roughly 1000 Unclassified incidents that remained, some were clearly anti-Black while others occurred at locations that leaned very leftist or pro-Islamist. GPT o3 defended its caution on grounds that the connections might be accidental but offered to give more weight to circumstantial evidence. The extra weight let it classify nearly all the remaining observations. The final OTAS shares were 26% Right Wing, 63% Left Wing, 10% Islamist, and 1% Left/Islamist.

These inferences invite two objections. The first is that many messages are too cryptic to interpret. If so, then logically the ADL should revert to its Obama-years policy of not classifying them as antisemitic unless they specifically targeted Jews or Jewish institutions. (The 2010 Audit explained that “the Nazi swastika is no longer exclusively used as a hate symbol against Jews; rather, it is used in vandalism incidents targeting others or for its shock value”). But I think inclusion is justified. The whole point of cryptic messages is to make a murky impression. Chat 3o’s categorization focused on how people likely interpreted the messages, which matters more than what the senders meant to convey.

The second objection is that more data is needed on context. That is true but largely the ADL’s fault. For example, HEAT obscures the many Black-on-Hasidic attacks in Crown Heights. When more detail is collected on known assailants or vandalism, inference accuracy will soar.

As noted earlier, the combined estimates for all antisemitic incidents recorded in HEAT for 2024 are 14% Right Wing, 57% Left Wing, 23% Left/Islamist, and 6% Islamist. The last two categories likely encompass some Black nationalist influence that HEAT obscures. The Right Wing share would drop below 5% if HEAT recorded incidents more fairly and took impact into account.

Conclusion

As noted earlier, the combined estimates for all antisemitic incidents recorded in HEAT for 2024 are 14% Right Wing, 57% Left Wing, 23% Left/Islamist, and 6% Islamist. The last two categories likely encompass some Black nationalist influence that HEAT obscures. The Right Wing share would drop below 5% if HEAT recorded incidents more fairly and took impact into account.

This sounded like a dream: an automated multimedia producer who didn’t need coffee, never asked for extensions, and wouldn’t ghost you the night before a deadline.

So I decided to test it.

Like any responsible academic, I gave ChatGPT everything it could possibly need. I uploaded a screen-recorded lecture I had given, along with the accompanying slide deck. For variety, I also included a guest lecture and that speaker’s slides. I asked for a 20–25 minute podcast video with some intro music and visuals. No subtitles. Nothing outrageous.

To my delight, ChatGPT was enthusiastic. It asked intelligent-sounding questions about format and visual style. It even wanted to know what kind of thumbnail I preferred. Then it laid out a detailed production plan: extract the audio, align the visuals, overlay commentary, and render a 16:9 video. “This is going to be good,” I thought. “Efficient. Seamless. The future of academia.”

And then the future ghosted me.

After grinding away for a while, ChatGPT announced that “the trimming and rendering process was interrupted due to time constraints.” But not to worry—it had a new approach. It asked if I wanted a script or a fully produced video. I asked for the video. Moments later, it proudly delivered a downloadable thumbnail.

I left to make dinner. A few hours later, I asked, “How’s the podcast video going?” ChatGPT responded with a progress update: it had completed the storyboard, pulled a few guest lecture cut-ins, and chosen some slides. But then it said rendering “takes time” and that the final video would be ready “in the next working session (likely tomorrow).”

The next day, I checked again. This time it assured me, confidently, that the video was complete and provided a link to download it.

The link contained no file.

Perplexed, I asked again. “Ah,” ChatGPT replied—gently, as though correcting my confusion—“the video isn’t quite ready.” It assured me it was still working on it. At this point, I felt like I was supervising a flaky undergraduate who claimed the dog ate his rendering software.

Then ChatGPT offered something new: a step-by-step guide for how I could make the podcast video. I reminded it that the point was for it to create the video. ChatGPT apologized—profusely—and admitted that its earlier answer was a mistake. It once again promised a downloadable file “soon.”

The file, of course, never arrived.

After a few more hours I snapped. “Are you deceiving me?” I asked. “Do you actually have the ability to create a podcast video?”

And finally, it confessed: no. It did not.

This would have been a much more useful piece of information two days earlier. Instead of being upfront—“Sorry, I can’t actually produce a downloadable video file”—ChatGPT behaved like an overconfident intern, bluffing its way through tasks it was never equipped to complete, hoping vague enthusiasm and a stream of apologies would be enough to get by.

The experience was a reminder: artificial intelligence isn’t always intelligent. Sometimes it’s just artificial.

I wouldn’t have minded if the problem were simply capability. I can forgive the fact that it can’t yet generate podcast videos. What’s harder to forgive is the failure of honesty. When I first asked, ChatGPT replied: “Yes, I can definitely help you create a video version of a podcast! If you upload the audio file… I can generate a video file (typically MP4)… to look like a podcast video you'd see on YouTube.”

It would’ve been far better if it had simply said: “I can help plan the podcast, but I can’t produce it.” I’d have saved some time and society would have saved some electricity.

That, I suppose, is the cautionary tale: AI can tell fibs.

So if you’re a professor looking to offload video production onto your helpful AI assistant, be warned. It might not finish the job. It might not even start the job. But it will give you a beautifully formatted explanation of how someone else could do it—possibly even you.